8 and parallel organizations.’11 Thus, Victoria 82 ordered the annihilation of those considered to be “subversives” or the “enemy within.”12 42. The policy of counterinsurgency in Guatemala, especially during the most violent period of the conflict, was characterized by military actions aimed at destroying groups and communities as such, through the slaughter of defenseless populations, the so-called massacres13 and the scorchedearth operations.14 The CEH registered 626 massacres committed by State forces during the armed conflict,15 with the support of patrol groups like the military commissioners,16 the Judiciales17 and the Civil Self-Defense Patrols (PAC).18. 43. Concerning the PAC, it is important to point out that in late 1981, the de facto military regime of General Ríos Montt devised a counterinsurgency strategy that sought to actively enlist the civilian population, especially the Mayan communities. This was how the PAC emerged as groups of civilian men that the Army organized, through the use of coercion, to operate as a parallel paramilitary force, for the ultimate purpose of causing social disintegration.19 In its 1985 Special Report, the IACHR documented the fact that the PAC “operate in their villages, mainly, performing patrol, defense and control functions and are regulated by various laws, regulations and higher military orders.” 20 1.2. Impact of the armed conflict on the Mayan indigenous peoples 1.2. 1. Identification as an “enemy within” 44. Based on the National Security Doctrine, the Army singled out the Mayan indigenous population as the “enemy within”, as it believed that they were or could be the guerrilla movement’s support base.21 The CEH concluded that this policy was based on an undeniable racism against the 11 Annex 2. CEH, Memory of Silence, Volume VI, Illustrative Cases, p. 356. 12 Annex 1. CEH, Memory of Silence, Volume V, Conclusions and Recommendations, par. 15. 13 Annex 1. CEH, Memory of Silence, Volume V, Conclusions and Recommendations, paragraphs 85-88. 14 Annex 1. CEH, Memory of Silence, Volume V, Conclusions and Recommendations, paragraphs 65-67. 15 Annex 1. CEH, Memory of Silence, Volume V, Conclusions and Recommendations, par. 86. 16 From the start of the armed conflict, the military commissioners were the Army’s representatives within each community. Annex 1. CEH, Memory of Silence, Volume V, Conclusions and Recommendations, par. 80. 17 The judiciales were an investigative body of the National Police; during the armed conflict, especially during the most violent years, they largely took their orders from and were controlled by the Army. Annex 1. CEH, Memory of Silence, Volume V, Conclusions and Recommendations, par. 43. 18 The PAC were created in late 1981 by the de facto military regime of General Ríos Montt, as part of a policy to exterminate the guerrilla movement by relocating the indigenous population and wiping out any suspicious persons, using means that constituted violations of human rights. The PAC began in the department of El Quiché, and expanded into other departments. IACHR, Fourth Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83 doc. 16 rev., June 1, 1993. Available at: http://www.IACHR.oas.org/countryrep/Guatemala93sp/indice.htm. 19 Annex 1. CEH, Memory of Silence, Volume V, Conclusions and Recommendations, par. 50. 20 IACHR, Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of Guatemala, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, approved on October 3, 1985], Chapter III, paragraphs 24 et seq. Available [only in Spanish] at: http://www.IACHR.org/countryrep/Guatemala93eng/chapter.6.htm 21 Annex 1. CEH, Memory of Silence, Volume V, Conclusions and Recommendations, par. 15.