establishing that “[i]t is an obligation of judges to declare the prescription of the action to prosecute offenses when the conditions established by [law] exist.” 150 115. Based on the above, during the public hearing, the Court asked the State to provide, as helpful evidence, among other documents, “copy of the decision on the consultation with regard to the criminal prescription in this case pursuant to the provisions of article 398 of the Ecuadorian Code of Criminal Procedure,” because, if the remedy of appeal had not been filed against the decision declaring the prescription of the action, the higher court should still have reviewed, by means of the consultation procedure, the legality of this decision. However, the State did not respond to this request, not even by describing the result of this action. 116. Accordingly, the Court considers that, according to the evidence provided in the instant case, this remedy was evidently inadmissible, because the presumptions that allow the prescription decision to be revoked are unrelated to the delay in the processing of the criminal proceedings. In this regard, in this case, the remedy would have neither legal nor factual effects because it did not comply with the legal requirements for its admissibility established in Article 108 of the Penal Code; 151 in other words, that the convicted man had committed another offense that warranted the same or a greater punishment, or a difference with regard to the calculation of the time frame for prescription. Therefore, the unsatisfactory handling of the proceedings did not exist as a cause of admissibility of the appeal. Consequently, even though article 348(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes the remedy of appeal to oppose the declaration of prescription, it would not be considered admissible to try and reverse the declaration of prescription that had already taken effect ipso jure, as revealed by the evidence in the case file. 117. Pursuant to articles 14, 23, 24, 428 and 460 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 152 the Prosecution, as the entity responsible for the criminal action, could have filed the necessary remedies in order to activate and expedite the proceedings by the recusal or appeal, as appropriate. 153 Even though the victim and her next of kin could file a private accusation, in a supplementary or complementary way, this did not substitute for the prosecution’s role and its obligation to take action. In this regard, the State also failed to justify why the prosecution did not undertake these actions. ii. Recusal 150 Cf. Former Supreme Court of Justice. Gaceta Judicial, Prescription of the Criminal Action, August 26, 1949 (brief with final arguments of the State, folio 880). 151 Cf. Penal Code of Ecuador (1971), article 108. 152 Code of Criminal Procedure (1983). Article 14 established that: “The criminal action is public in nature. In general, it is exercised, ex officio, and the private accusation is admissible.” Article 23 stipulated that “[t]he intervention of the Public Prosecution Service shall be required in all criminal proceedings that, owing to the perpetration of an offense, are initiated in the corresponding tribunals and courts, even when a private accuser acts in such proceedings, provided that the said offense must be prosecuted ex officio.” Article 24 established that: “The Public Prosecution Service may not renounce the obligation to file the criminal action, unless there are reasons that justify its renunciation.” Article 428 established that: “[u]nder a private accusation, the criminal judges shall hear only” some offenses, which do not include any offense related to injuries or to medical malpractice. Article 460 stipulated that: “When the proceedings are referred to a higher court, by an appeal or for consultation, the Public Prosecution Service shall be advised so that it issues its opinion on the principle and rules, if appropriate, on the fines that must be imposed for omissions or delays in the substantiation of the proceedings. The omission of this obligation shall make the Head of the Public Prosecution Service liable to the fines that are not collected.” 153 Cf. Case of Albán Cornejo et al., supra, para. 92. 33