18 decide whether to proceed to release him or to maintain the deprivation of liberty. In the instant case, there is no evidence that this occurred. 86. In view of the above, the Court finds that the duration of Mr. Chaparro’s detention exceeded the permitted legal maximum, thus violating Article 7(2) of the Convention, and that he was not brought before a judge “promptly,” in violation of Article 7(5) of the Convention. 87. In Mr. Lapo’s case, as indicated above (supra para. 66), his detention was unlawful from the outset so that, whatever its length, it was intrinsically unlawful, making it unnecessary for the Court to examine the maximum duration established in domestic law in order to apply Article 7(2) of the Convention. With regard to Article 7(5) of the Convention, Mr. Lapo was not brought “promptly” before a judge to control the unlawfulness of his arrest, which entailed the violation of that principle. * * * 88. Based on the above, the Court declares that the State violated the right embodied in Article 7(2), 7(4) and 7(5) of the Convention to the detriment of Mr. Chaparro, and the right embodied in Article 7(2) and 7(5) of this international instrument to the detriment of Mr. Lapo. Consequently, it violated the right to personal liberty of the two victims established in Article 7(1) of the Convention, in relation to the obligation to respect rights established in Article 1(1) thereof. C) THE ARBITRARY NATURE OF THE DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY OF MESSRS. CHAPARRO AND LAPO 89. Article 7(3) of the Convention establishes that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment.” 90. On other occasions the Court has established that: No one may be subjected to arrest or imprisonment for reasons and using methods that – although classified as legal – can be considered incompatible with regard for the fundamental rights of the individual, because they are, among other matters, unreasonable, unpredictable, or disproportionate.44 91. The European Court of Human Rights has established that, although any arrest must be made in keeping with a procedure prescribed by domestic law, this domestic law must also be in conformity with the Convention, including the general principles expressed or implied therein.45 92. The Human Rights Committee has stated that: 44 Cf. Case of Gangaram Panday v. Suriname. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of January 21, 1994. Series C No. 16, para. 47. 45 Cf. ECHR, Kemmache v. France, Judgment of 24 November 1994, para. 37. The European Court ruled as follows: The Court reiterates that the words "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law" essentially refer back to domestic law; they state the need for compliance with the relevant procedure under that law. However, the domestic law must itself be in conformity with the Convention, including the general principles expressed or implied therein. The notion underlying the term in question is one of fair and proper procedure, namely that any measure depriving a person of his liberty should issue from and be executed by an appropriate authority and should not be arbitrary (see the Winterwerp v. the Netherlands judgment of 24 October 1979, Series A no. 33, pp. 19-20, para. 45).