42 Art. 3. The daily amounts resulting from the deposit, custody and administration shall be paid by the owner of the property, based on its value […] Art. 6. The fees charged by CONSEP, as custodian, for leasing property are six point seventy-five percent (6.75 %) of the income obtained, and this shall be collected before the property is returned. […] Art. 10. If the deposit generates expenses other than those of the deposit, custody and administration, these shall also be paid by the owner of the property. […] 192. Mr. Chaparro was charged both “administrative expenses” and “CONSEP fees.”134 193. In this regard, the Court emphasizes that material precautionary measures are adopted with regard to the property of a person who is presumed innocent; hence, these measures should not prejudice the accused disproportionately. The charges that a person whose case has been dismissed is required to pay, with regard to the property of which he was provisionally dispossessed, constitute a burden that is tantamount to a sanction. This requirement is disproportionate for those persons whose guilt has not been proved. On this point, the State indicated that, “when property owned by a person who has been acquitted in criminal proceedings is returned or restituted,” “a certain rate of interest must be paid for the custody or administration undertaken by the State while it was confiscated”; this “[i]s a clear example of arbitrariness that must be corrected by the Ecuadorean State, through the respective legal reform.” 194. The Court’s case law135 has interpreted that the obligation to adapt domestic laws entails the adoption of measures that eliminate norms and practices of any nature that give rise to a violation of the guarantees established in the Convention or that disregard the rights recognized therein or hinder their exercise.136 195. Based on these findings, and the observations of the State (supra para. 193), the Court concludes that the amount charged to Mr. Chaparro in application of Resolution No. 059-CD of 2000 affected him disproportionately. Consequently, the Court declares that the State violated his right to property embodied in Article 21(1) in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention. B) ARBITRARINESS OF THE SEIZURE OF THE PROPERTY 196. The Commission stated that the police report corresponding to the search of the factory, “did not state the reason why it was decided to seize [it], nor did it indicate that drugs or any narcotic substance had been found that would justify this measure.” The Commission added that the search “did not find any evidence and, from the outset of the procedure, it was not possible to determine that the ice chests used in the attempt to transport drugs had been manufactured in this establishment.” In this regard, the Commission considered that restrictions to the right to property must be justified in light of a “relationship of proportionality between the measures used and the purpose of the restriction.” The representatives endorsed these considerations. The State alleged that the factory was “seized respecting the procedure described in Articles 104 and 105 of [the NDPSA] and was returned to its owner in accordance with Article 110 of [this] Act, 134 Cf. statement issued by the CONSEP Custodian-Administrator of Immovable Property (file of appendixes to the application, appendix 37, folio 1198). 135 136 Cf. Case of La Cantuta, supra note 16, para. 172. Cf. Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo Bustos et al.) v. Chile. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of February 5, 2001. Series C No. 73, para. 85; Case of Almonacid Arrellano et al., supra note 17, para. 118; and Case of Ximenes Lopes, supra note 17, para. 83.