32 B) GRANTING THE ACCUSED ADEQUATE TIME AND MEANS TO PREPARE HIS DEFENSE 149. The Commission and the representatives indicated that notification of the IonScanner expert appraisal procedure (supra para. 114) “was not given with sufficient advance notice,” and this prevented the victims and their lawyers from being present and contesting its validity. The Commission considered that “the right to defense of the victims was restricted because, if they had been present […] during the expert appraisal, they would have been able to contest its validity, without having to wait almost four years to have it annulled.” 150. Article 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in force at the time established that “[j]udges must intervene personally and directly when procedural actions concerning evidence are practiced, and shall ensure that they are carried out respecting the legal norms.” Article 22.19(e) of the Constitution stipulated that “[n]o one may be […] deprived of the right to defense at any stage or level of the proceedings […].” 151. On January 7, 1998, at 6.30 p.m., the Guayas Twelfth Criminal Judge ordered that the Ion-Scanner test be carried out on the premises of the Plumavit factory and on other premises. The judge decided that the tests would be conducted “on January 8, 1998, as of 10 a.m.”89 This decision was notified to the parties, through the ‘casillero judicial’ (Translator’s note: legal notification mail box; possibly an electronic mail box), on January 8, 1998, “at 9 a.m.”90 The procedure was carried out at “11.55 a.m.”91 In other words, the judicial decision was notified with two hours and fifty-five minutes notice. 152. The Court observes that late notification of the judicial decision ordering that the Ion-Scanner test be carried out made it impossible for the defense lawyers to be present during the test. Although it is true that it is not necessarily reasonable to have the parties present when every type of evidence is being produced, in the instant case, given that the results of the technical verification were immediate, the fact that both parties to the proceedings were not present during the Ion-Scanner test could not be replaced by the subsequent presentation of their observations. In addition, the Court accords special relevance to the fact that the Ion-Scanner test was the only technical evidence against the victims and was taken into account by the judge to commit Mr. Chaparro to trial. 153. This disregard of the right of defense was underscored by the Guayas Twelfth Criminal Prosecutor in his report of December 23, 1998. The Attorney General’s Office (Ministerio Público) considered that, during this test, “certain legal formalities were sacrificed, because it was carried out very hastily, and this did not allow the parties involved to attend the test.” He added that “the procedure was conducted hurriedly, adversely affecting the right to defense of the parties.”92 The Prosecutor also identified other flaws; for example, that the experts who took part in the procedure did not submit their respective reports, and that the DEA Director in Guayaquil, who had not been 89 Cf. court order issued on January 7, 1998, by the Guayas Twelfth Criminal Judge (judicial case file, volume 25, folio 4009). 90 Cf. notification order issued on January 8, 1998, by the Secretariat of the Guayas Twelfth Criminal Court (file of appendixes to the application, appendix 17, folio 897) and notification order issued on January 8, 1998 (judicial case file, volume 25, folio 4010). 91 92 Cf. record of the Ion-Scan expert appraisal, supra note 65. Cf. opinion of the Guayas Twelfth Criminal Prosecutor issued on December 23, 1998, in criminal proceedings #370-97 (file of appendixes to the application, appendix 20, folios 1047 to 1050).