4 in Article 9 of the American Convention, but rather an additional benefit, and a prompt and opportune guarantee. 13. By stating this, I am not disagreeing, even remotely, with the judgment I have signed. I am not validating the delivery of habeas corpus to political and administrative authorities (mayors, for example), rather, I am affirming that the violation or error committed by the captor can be corrected without delay by that authority, not by means of habeas corpus and in substitution of the judicial authority or as an instance that precedes the latter, but in order to provide prompt justice, which eliminates the violation and restores liberty. Moreover, I am thinking of the situation that could arise when the administrative authority is able to act promptly, owing to his proximity to the person captured and to the captor, and the judicial authority is at a certain distance that must be covered – promptly, evidently – in order to request this liberty. c) Formality 14. In the instant case, the Court also examined the characteristics of the act of judicial control (referring to the precedent established in other cases); that is, the presence, action and diligence of the judge who controls the form and duration of the detention. Obviously, the purpose of the guarantees contained in the Convention and in the laws of a democratic society that protect rights and establish guarantees, is not merely an appearance of control, which could derive in the mere presence of a judicial authority at a determined act, more or less distant and even covert. What is needed is an effective presence – conscious, explanatory, investigative, helpful – of the subject before the judge and a real awareness on the part of the judge, as a requirement for genuine control based on a grounded and reasoned decision. d) Diligence 15. Regarding the diligence in the actions of the authorities required by various provisions under different hypotheses (the decision on detention, pursuant to Article 7 of the American Convention; the development and conclusion of the trial, according to Article 8), the expressions used by the applicable provisions, by case law and legal doctrine, by the vox populi and by common sense, and the experience deposited in the discourse of the defendants, all point towards the prompt and expedient action of the authority called on to decide (as rapidly as that authority would wish a decision to be made if he himself was subject to trial, for one moment taking the place of the accused on the defendant’s bench) on the reasonable promptness of the decision, the removal of obstacles, and the elimination of delays that postpone the control of the lawfulness or legitimacy of the act, the settlement of a dispute, or the adoption of an urgent measure (particularly for the person who is subject to the action of justice: a temporary resident in the labyrinths of any stage of the proceedings. 16. There can be – and there are – general criteria to assess reasonable time, related to the different hypotheses posed, and accepted in the intention of different expressions. The Court, which deals with developments of European case law under this point, has referred to the complexity of the issues, the conduct of the authorities (judicial and other, who intervene in the proceedings and, through their procedural conduct, influence the latter’s development, its “times and movements”), the conduct of the accused (and even more of his legal counsel, who guides the defense “strategy and tactics”). The latter, we must emphasize, does not conclude with the transfer to the individual of “responsibility” for the duration of the process. The Court has never suggested that there has been or there exists such a transfer of responsibility and assignment of prejudice.