to submit its reply had not been made available to it. On July 26, 1996, the Ecuadorian State submitted its response to the petition, which was forwarded to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted additional observations on October 15, 1996, May 12, 1997, December 11, 1998 and April 19, 1999. The State, in turn, submitted additional observations on January 29, 1997 and October 15, 1997. 6. In a communication of April 21, 2003, the Commission advised the petitioners of its decision to apply Article 37.3 of the Rules of Procedure in force at the time and, in so doing, put off addressing admissibility until the time of the examination and decision on the merits. On September 8, 2003, the Commission received observations on the merits from the petitioner. On January 15, 2004, the petitioner submitted additional information. On February 9, 2004, the Commission forwarded the relevant portions of the observations submitted by the petitioner to the State and advised the State of its decision to postpone addressing admissibility until the time of examination and decision on the merits, requesting its observations within a period of two months. On May 28, 2004, the State submitted its observations on the merits. The petitioner provided additional observations on the merits on March 8, 2005. The IACHR received a communication from the Ecuadorian State on November 3, 2005, moving for the case to be found inadmissible and archived without further delay and contending that any further communications between the petitioner and the State was inappropriate during said stage of the proceedings, and that the only appropriate thing was for “the Commission to rule on the merits.” 7. On August 12, 2012, the Commission requested the petitioner to indicate whether or not the grounds for the petition still existed and what the current status of the alleged victims was. On September 6, 2012, the petitioner reported that the grounds for the petition still existed. Said information was transferred to the State in a note of October 3, 2012. On that same date, as well as on August 13, 2013, the Commission reiterated to the State its request for it to submit additional information on the merits, which has not been received as of the date of the instant report. III. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES A. The Petitioner 8. She contended that based on classified information on the existence of an international drug trafficking ring, agents of the Pichincha Interpol office began tracking a woman named Alba Tinitana as of July 1994, ascertaining that she would meet with foreigners in different hotels. The petitioner alleged that on August 2, 1994, the police chief requested a search warrant for several properties and, during the course of that afternoon, Interpol agents arrested 12 individuals, including, Jorge Herrera and Luis Jaramillo, both Colombian nationals; Emmanuel Cano, a French national; and Eusebio Domingo, a Spanish national, the alleged victims in the instant case. 9. She claimed that on August 3, 1994, the Police Chief authorized the arrest of the alleged victims and ordered an investigation to be conducted within 48 hours without making any legal defense counsel available to any of them. She contended that on August 8, 1994, the Police filed a report based on selfincriminating statements given through torture and, on August 9, 1994, forensic medical experts confirmed torture-related injuries that the alleged victims presented. Notwithstanding, on August 19, 1994, the Twelfth Judge for Criminal Matters of Pichincha formalized criminal charges and instituted criminal proceedings ordering that the alleged victims be held in pretrial custody. 10. The petitioner asserted that during the preliminary investigation proceedings the alleged victims submitted medical reports as proof of the torture that was inflicted upon them. However, according to the petition, the Twelfth Judge for Criminal Matters of Pichincha closed the preliminary investigation on September 13, 1995 and ordered the representative of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to issue its decision to prosecute or not, as provided by law. The petitioner noted that, at that time, Jorge Eliécer Herrera Espinoza and Emmanuel Cano had escaped custody while being transferred to other detention facilities and, consequently, their proceedings were suspended. 2