11. She contended that because the same judge “does not preside” at the intermediate stage, in keeping with the statutory time periods, he was recused and the case was assigned instead to the Thirteenth Judge for Criminal Matters of Pichincha, who on August 14, 1996, issued the order to institute the trial stage of the proceedings, taking into account the statements given to the Interpol agents and noting that no evidence had been introduced that the presence of the alleged victims in Ecuador was legal and asserting that there was prima facie evidence of the charges leveled in the police report, since the drugs had been found in the possession of one of the defendants. 12. The petitioner also noted that Eusebio Domingo Revelles filed an appeal of the decision to institute trial proceedings, which was heard by the Fourth Chamber of the Superior Court of Quito, finding on November 18, 1997 that in denouncing that he was forced to plead guilty when he gave his initial statement to the judge, he was trying to circumvent his involvement in and his responsibility for the crime. 13. She contended that the trial proceeding was heard by the Second Court for Criminal Matters of Pichincha, which on April 1, 1998, convicted Domingo Revelles as an accomplice and sentenced him to a six-year prison term, ordering a review (‘consultation of judgment’) by the Fourth Chamber of the Superior Court. This review was completed on November 24, 1998, upholding the judgment of conviction and sentence. 14. The petitioner noted that because Mr. Eusebio Domingo Revelles believed that he had been held in custody for several years without a dispositive judgment having been handed down, in August 1998 he filed a petition for habeas corpus relief with the Office of the Mayor of Quito, which denied his petition on August 25, 1998. She indicated that the Constitutional Court heard the petition for relief on appeal and, on November 9, 1998, denied it. 15. She argued that the right to personal liberty was violated, inasmuch as the alleged victims were arrested without any of them being caught in flagrante delicto; they were held in solitary confinement and their detention was not made legal until the following day. The petitioner also asserted that on August 8, 1994, the police report was sent to the Twelfth Court for Criminal Matters of Pichincha yet the preliminary investigation opened nor was a pretrial custody order against them issued not until August 19, 1994. She argued that Eusebio Domingo Revelles remained in temporary custody for more than 4 years, which amounts to “arbitrary imprisonment,” since the habeas corpus remedy was ineffective. 16. She contended that the right to humane treatment was violated on the grounds that the Interpol agents inflicted psychological damage and trauma on the alleged victims, and this constituted torture. 17. The petitioner alleged that the right to a fair trial and judicial protection was violated, because criminal responsibility was determined based on the pre-indictment statements (before the police) given through torture outside the presence of defense counsel, shifting the burden of proof to alleged victims to prove their innocence. She argued that the State never investigated whether the drugs belonged to the person who was charged or were placed on him by the police. She also contended that the authority presumed the guilt of the alleged victims. 18. She noted that even though they were foreign nationals, the alleged victims were not permitted to communicate with the consular officer of their countries, and even after several years had elapsed, the State has not investigated the police officers who illegally detained them and conducted interrogations of the detainees through torture. She argued that the proceedings did not take a reasonable period of time and exceeded all of the statutory deadlines set forth for the stages of the preliminary investigation. 19. As for the admissibility requirements, the petitioner argues that the exception set forth in Article 46.2.c of the Convention is applicable with regard to torture. Similarly, because the victims were undergoing a criminal proceeding, they were entitled to a disposition within a reasonable period of time, and because it took more than four years to be settled, said situation also meets the requirement for the exception of Article 46.2.c of the Convention. 3