20. As for the claim of the State regarding Eusebio Domingo Revelles’ failure to exhaust the remedy of the petition for writ of reversal of judgment on cassation, the petitioner countered that said remedy was pursued against the judgment of the Second Court for Criminal Matters. She also argued that, notwithstanding, because said judgment was reviewed by the Fourth Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice of Quito, as required by the drug law, and the ruling on said petition took a long time, Mr. Domingo Revelles “was compelled to withdraw the petition for writ of reversal of judgment on cassation.” She contended that according to the Code of Execution of Sentences, he could only benefit from a reduction of half of the prison term, if his judgment was already final and dispositive. As to the motion for review, she asserted that this remedy was not available to him, because pursuant to the “Law of Foreign Nationals,” once his sentence is served, Mr. Domingo Revelles was immediately deported to Spain leaving him unable to pursue further recourse. B. The State 21. The State argued that the alleged victims were arrested on August 2, 1994, as part of the drug enforcement sting operation known as “Linda,” for which court proceedings were instituted on August 17, 1994, leading to a conviction for the crime of unlawful possession of narcotic substances. 22. As for the right to humane treatment, it contended that the claim of torture is only supported by the testimony of the alleged victims and reports written by the court-appointed forensic medical experts. Notwithstanding, it alleges “it is obvious” that it cannot be established based on said reports that the injuries were caused by any agent of the State or with the support or tolerance thereof. 23. As for the right to personal liberty, it argued that the victims were arrested for the purpose of conducting investigations into illegal activities in a sting operation known as “Operation Lindo,” with a basis in many statements of witnesses and other individuals connected in some way, and therefore the legal requirements were satisfied just as they apply to any arrest. 24. The State contended that the fact that the police report on the investigation conducted by the National Police assigned to the Prosecuting Attorney was sent to the competent judge and to the Chief of Police of Pichincha on August 3, 1004, that is, one day after the arrest, proves that the report was submitted to the authorities without any of the provisions of Article 7 of the Convention being violated. It claimed that the two-day delay for the detainee to be brought before the judge cannot be deemed as excessive, particularly because of the “highly trying” circumstances given the number of persons arrested and the particular offenses involved. 25. With regard to the need to order pretrial detention, it claimed that this order was in line with the criteria for this purpose upheld by the Inter-American Commission, inasmuch as i) there was convincing evidence of their responsibility and the alleged victims “were suspects” of committing criminal offenses that were classified as such prior to the arrest; ii) the seriousness and potential severity of the punishment must be taken into account to assess the chance of the defendant attempting to abscond in order to evade justice; iii) the “evident risk that exists that these citizens continue to commit their illegal acts; and iv) there was a need to investigate the facts. 26. The State argued that the court proceeding took a reasonable period of time because i) the matter was complex due to the need to prosecute around thirty-three suspects, the size of the case file –six hundred pages – and the complexity in and of itself of the crimes they were charged with; ii) the petitioner never cooperated with the investigation activities; and iii) the judicial authorities acted expeditiously “despite the complexity and characteristics of the matter.” The State requested the Commission to take into consideration the circumstances involved in the case and to adopt the criterion held by the European Court with regard to “non-responsibility of the State” for a temporary case backlog in the courts of justice. 27. As for the right to judicial protection, the State argued that the alleged victims had unlimited access to each and every remedy provided by Ecuadorian law to safeguard the right to personal liberty and other fundamental rights. Nonetheless, the remedies available in the State were not properly exhausted 4