35. In this regard, the State argues that the analysis of exhaustion of domestic remedies should not be focused on the prosecutorial decision with respect to the crime of torture because the authorities understood the facts alleged as rape (violación sexual) and abuse of authority. They also state that the domestic criminal legislation, in addition to the remedy that was rejected as time-barred, provides for the motion for cassation, which was not exhausted by the alleged victim either. In other words, even in the event that the alleged victim had filed the appeal within the statutory time for doing so, and even if it had been declared to be unfounded, that decision on appeal could have also been brought before the Supreme Court by means of a motion for cassation. 36. In addition, the State observes that as regards the petitioners’ argument of alleged intimidation of Mr. Luis Alberto Rojas Marín by both prosecutors, the alleged victim filed a complaint against both prosecutors with the Decentralized Office of Internal Control of La Libertad. In this respect, it argues that the prosecutorial rulings issued throughout the criminal proceedings were not issued by the prosecutors who were called into question, but by another prosecutor who was assigned to the case, which is why it indicates that the alleged actions of these prosecutors did not affect the proper development of the domestic proceeding. 37. Finally, the State argues that the petitioners go beyond the factual framework of the instant case because they did not allege in the original petition, or in Peruvian courts, the aspects relating to the regulation of the crime of torture in the Peruvian Criminal Code, due diligence in the investigation in general, and as to the absence of a national registry of complaints in cases of torture. In addition, the State alleges that the petitioners seek a review of domestic judgments for not agreeing with the criteria used by the judges and reiterates that the Commission is not a sort of court of fourth instance. 38. In view of all the foregoing, the State asks that the petition be found inadmissible based on Articles 46(1)(a) and 47(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights. IV. ANALYSIS OF COMPETENCE AND ADMISSIBILITY A. Competence ratione personae, ratione loci, ratione temporis and ratione materiae of the IACHR 39. The petitioners are authorized by Article 44 of the Convention to file complaints. The alleged victim is an individual person who was under the jurisdiction of the Peruvian State as of the date of the facts. Peru deposited the instrument of ratification of the American Convention on July 28, 1978, and of the InterAmerican Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture on March 28, 1991. Accordingly, the Commission is competent ratione personae to examine the petition. 40. The Commission is competent ratione loci to take cognizance of the petition, insofar as it alleges violations of rights protected by the American Convention under jurisdiction of a State party to that treaty. 41. The Commission is competent ratione materiae, considering that the petition alleges facts that could characterize the violation of rights protected by the American Convention and the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. 42. Finally, the Commission is competent ratione temporis, for the obligation to respect and ensure the rights protected by the American Convention and the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture was already in force for the State on the date of the events alleged in the petition. B. Exhaustion of domestic remedies 43. Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention provides that in order for a complaint filed with the Inter-American Convention to be admissible under Article 44 of the Convention, it is necessary to have pursued and exhausted domestic remedies in keeping with generally recognized principles of international 7