- 13Serrano Cruz, because it has not determined the whereabouts of the two sisters, who are still disappeared, re-establishing their names and family ties. 42. Also, I do not see how the Court could fail to conclude that the respondent State has violated the rights of the child (Article 19 of the Convention), in relation to Article 1(1), to the detriment of Erlinda Serrano Cruz, who was under 18 years old when El Salvador accepted the Court’s contentious jurisdiction. And, I do not see how the Court could fail to reaffirm the right to life in its most ample dimension, meaning a decent life, which was not respected by the respondent State to the detriment of the sisters, Ernestina and Erlinda Serrano Cruz, who are still disappeared. I can only hope that this judgment on merits and reparations, and the previous judgment on preliminary objections in the instant case are only a momentary setback and very soon the InterAmerican Court will return to its line of evolutionary interpretation and its case law of the past five years, which emancipates the individual and has placed the Court in the vanguard of the international protection of human rights. III. Subsistence of State responsibility even though the Court limited its own jurisdiction 43. There is a final very important matter to examine in this dissenting opinion. Even though the Inter-American Court, in a decision which I believe to be incorrect, has limited its own jurisdiction, to the point of depriving itself of any consideration of the forced disappearance of the sisters, Ernestina and Erlinda Serrano Cruz, which still persists, the responsibility of the respondent State still subsists for the facts that have been proved in this case. Since the views expressed in my previous opinions for this Court appear to have evaporated with the winds of time, as if I was just talking to myself, I will rescue my reflections of almost a decade ago from apparent oblivion. 44. I do so, knowing that it is possible that no one will take them into account, in a post-modern world that cultivates “virtual reality”; in which, people increasingly have many opinions but read very little, talk a great deal but think very little. I do so, even if it is just for myself, because, like Ionesco’s rhinoceros, je ne capitule pas – even in a world in which the energies of those who practice the law of post-modernity seem to be almost entirely occupied by interminable39 meetings and seminars and by rushed and frenetic computer screens, and not by the silent, tranquil, supportive and instructive company of books that invite reflection. In brief, I do it moved by a sentiment of duty as a judge of this Court. 45. As I stated in my dissenting opinion (paragraph 24(19)) in Genie Lacayo v. Nicaragua (order of the Court on the request for review of judgment of September 13, 1997), and in my separate opinion (paras. 32-36) in Blake v. Guatemala (judgment on merits of January 24, 1998), I understand that it is as of the accession to or ratification of the American Convention on Human Rights that a new State Party undertakes to respect all the rights protected by the American Convention and to ensure their free and full exercise (starting with the fundamental right to life). The acceptance by a State of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court refers only to the legal proceedings before the Court in a specific human rights case. 46. Even though, the Court can only rule on a case after this acceptance of its jurisdiction by the State, in accordance with Article 62 of the Convention, this does not 39 Not to mention insupportable.