14 41. Additionally, Article 29(b) of the American Convention expressly prohibits the interpretation that limits the exercise of the protected rights. Thus, any reorientation of the constant case-law of the Court, integrative of Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention would only be justified in the measure in which they offer a greater protection of the rights enshrined, which is not the case. Up to this date, I have never heard in the debates, which I find worrying, that take place in the heart of the Court in this regard, any demonstration in the sense that dissociating or “separating” Article 8 from 25 would lead to a more efficient protection of the rights enshrined in the American Convention. 42. Said debates were unnecessarily repeated in the present case, one day after the adoption of the Judgment of this Court in the case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre, without the circumstances of the present case of López Álvarez justifying a sudden change of criteria by the Court on this matter, within a 24 hour period. Luckily, the understanding that the dissociating vision of Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention would lead to a regretful setback in this Court’s jurisprudence prevailed after a sterile debate, even more so before the current tendency, to the contrary, of general international jurisprudence on the subject. VII. The Overcoming of the Vicissitudes regarding the Right to an Effective Recourse in the Jurisprudential Construction of the European Court. 43. If other international organizations for the supervision of human rights have incurred in the uncertainties of a fragmenting interpretation, why would the InterAmerican Court have to follow this road, abdicating its avant-garde jurisprudence, that has won it the respect of the beneficiaries of our system of protection as well as of the international community, and assume a different position that has even been abandoned by other organizations that had mistakenly followed it in the past? This does not make any sense. 44. I take the liberty to illustrate this point with an example, extracted from the experience, of trial and error, of the European system of protection of human rights. In its beginning, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights stated the “accessory” nature of Article 13 (right to an effective recourse) of the European Convention on Human Rights, understood – as of the eighties – as guaranteeing a subjective substantive individual right. Gradually, in its judgments in the cases of Klass versus Alemania (1978), Silver et al. versus the United Kingdom (1983), and Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali versus the United Kingdom (1985), the European Court started acknowledging the autonomous nature of Article 13. Finally, after years of hesitation and fluctuations, the European Court, in its judgment of 12.18.1996 in the case of Aksoy versus Turkey (paragraphs 95-100), determined the occurrence of an “autonomous” violation of Article 13 of the European Convention. 45. In a pioneer study on the subject published in 1973, Pierre Mertens criticized the “poverty” of the European Court’s initial jurisprudence, as well as the vague nature of the European doctrine of that time on the subject, - different from the most advanced Latin American doctrine and practices, as of the adoption of the American Declaration of 1948, first international instrument to enshrine the right to an effective