hearing.” The Commission noted that it was entitled to give its view on the matter based on the principle of iura novit curia. 406. The Commission noted that, under the terms of several articles of the military code of justice in effect at the time of the facts and Law 24,150, as well as Article 173 of Peru’s Constitution,458 the reasoning used by the Supreme Court to settle the jurisdictional dispute between the military courts and the ordinary courts was based on the contention that the commandos who took part in operation Chavín de Huántar were serving “in the line of duty, following orders, in the framework of a state of emergency.” 407. The Commission recalled the Court’s case law in the Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico case, according to which, “even if the crime is committed by active-duty servicemen or as a result of duty-related actions, this is not enough to justify their coming before the military criminal justice system.” The Commission argued that, although the Supreme Court had ruled that the facts of the case could qualify as crimes against humanity, it found that they should be tried by the military courts for the military personnel who had participated in the operation. Citing the Court’s case law in the cases of Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela and Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, the Commission underscored that the Supreme Court’s interpretation had failed to establish clearly and unambiguously which of the crimes should be considered as part of military duty by identifying a direct, proximate line to that duty or to the violation of legal rights proper to the military system. The Commission held that, although the State had reported that in 2004 both the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court had handed down rulings that human rights violations could not be considered duty-related, it had not explained how that case law could be applicable to the facts of this case. 408. In view of these considerations, the Commission concluded that the State had failed to fulfill the obligation contained in Article 2 of the American Convention, read in conjunction with Articles 8 and 25, when it broadened the military jurisdiction to hear crimes having no direct relationship to military discipline or legally protected interests of the military system. 409. The representatives offered no arguments on possible violation of Article 2 of the American Convention read in conjunction with Articles 8 and 25. 410. The State asked the Court to relieve it of “responsibility for Article 2 of the American Convention, read in conjunction with Articles 8 and 25 thereof.” The State held that “it cannot be said […] that the intervention by the military courts was intended to cover up serious human rights violations” and that, even considering the hypothesis that some military court may have participated in the case with this perspective, “the situation was corrected by the subsequent rulings of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court.” The State also made reference to the use of law 24,150, emphasizing that “it had been amended by law and and was also amended when some of its articles or phrases were declared unconstitutional, even before the Commission had issued its Report on the Merits 66/11.” The State also clarified that the Supreme Court and the Supreme Military Court had applied substantive criminal laws that were on the books at the time, but which had now been repealed. Considerations of the Court It reads: “[i]n the case of a crime of duty, members of the military and the police are under the applicable jurisdiction and the military code of justice. The provisions of this code do not apply to civilians, although the law makes an exception for crimes of treason and terrorism […].” 458