the State itself admitted responsibility for breaching the right to a reasonable period in the trial held in the criminal courts,” adding that this constitutes “a change in the position it adopted previously and is not admissible under the principle of estoppel.”41 This statement needs to understood, however, in light of the judgment’s own words, that this recognition “refer[s] only to the infringement of the right to a reasonable period in the judicial proceedings before the criminal courts,”42 confirming that the recognition is entirely unrelated to compliance with the Convention’s Article 46(1)(a) requirement, “that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law”, but exclusively to the idea that this requirement is not applicable when, as stated in Article 46(2)(c) of the Convention, “there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under the aforementioned remedies.” There is therefore no apparent justification for broadening the State's recognition to cover the petition’s express request regarding the stipulations of Article 46(1)(a). Moreover, the State’s decision was first expressed when “it acknowledged responsibility in report 535-2011-JUS/PPES for the excessive amount of time it took to conduct the criminal proceedings” and said that “the delay in processing the criminal trial was not in any sense due to a will to deny justice, but to organizational issues in the courts and the criminal procedural code still in effect in the Lima judicial district.” Later, in its answering brief and comments on the brief of pleadings, motions and evidence, the State of Peru, on August 17, 2012, asked the Court “to consider the points discussed in the answering brief, which outline the objective reasons for the delay in processing the criminal case.”43 These assertions, cannot, strictly speaking, constitute recognition per se, despite the terms being used, at least in the sense outlined by Article 62 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure, 44 because they were made by the State in response to the charges leveled against it by the Commission, including that it had not complied with the provisions of Article 46(2), but this did not mean that it stepped back from its position that domestic remedies had not been exhausted prior to the lodging of the petition. Therefore, to insist that the State would be jeopardized any anything it might say after its objection had been dismissed by the Commission means that it would be unable to defend itself before the Commission and, even more, that it would not later be able to avail itself of the objection before the Court, and this would be unreasonable. It would make no sense for the judgment to dismiss the preliminary objection on failure to exhaust domestic remedies on the basis of actions taken by the State long after the petition was lodged and its observations were submitted, and on which the Commission, and ultimately the Court, should have ruled. 41 Para. 53 of the judgment. 42 Paras. 24 and 53 of the Judgment. 43 Para. 19 of the judgment. “If the respondent informs the Court of its acceptance of the facts or its total or partial acquiescence to the claims stated in the presentation of the case or the brief submitted by the alleged victims or their representatives, the Court shall decide, having heard the opinions of all those participating in the proceedings and at the appropriate procedural moment, whether to accept that acquiescence, and shall rule upon its juridical effects.” 44 16