Strict adherence to the rule on prior exhaustion of domestic remedies is therefore not a mere formality or a legal nicety; respect for this rule consolidates and bolsters the inter-American system of human rights, because this is the way it guarantees the principles of legal certainty, procedural balance, and complementarity that undergird the system. The Court’s judgments must leave no room whatsoever or, in the worst case, as little as possible, for the perception that they do not strictly, exclusively reflect the precepts of justice, even beyond the understandable differences of opinion that the Court’s judgments may arouse, particularly by those who are antagonistic to them. Obviously, the Court’s case law is binding only on the State that has undertaken to comply with the “judgment of the Court” in cases to which it is a party,50 and that for the other States Parties to the Convention it is merely an auxiliary source of public international law, that is, “an auxiliary means to determine the rules of law”51. This dissenting opinion is therefore issued in the hope that it will contribute to a process of reflection on the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies and as a result, in the near future, the Court’s case law on the subject would adopt the views elucidated herein. It is also undeniable that this opinion, much like an earlier one, 52 takes into account that one of the particular imperatives facing a court such as ours is that it acts with full awareness that, as an autonomous, independent institution, it has no higher authority overseeing it. This presupposes that, out of respect for the lofty mission it has been given, it must strictly honor the limits of its role, and it must abide and develop in the sphere proper to a judicial body. Unquestionably, proceeding in this way would be the best contribution the Court can make to consolidating and developing the inter-American system of human rights, an indispensable requirement if it is to properly safeguard these rights. The Commission’s task in this Art. 68 of the Convention: “1.The States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. 2. That part of a judgment that stipulates compensatory damages may be executed in the country concerned in accordance with domestic procedure governing the execution of judgments against the state.” 50 Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: “1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bond, if the parties agree thereto.” 51 Art. 59 of the same Statute: “The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case” Art. 68 of the Convention: “1.The States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. 2. That part of a judgment that stipulates compensatory damages may be executed in the country concerned in accordance with domestic procedure governing the execution of judgments against the state.” Record of complaint filed with the Court on August 17, 2011 and dissenting opinion by Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi judgment on merits, reparations and costs, Case of Barbani Duarte et al. v. Uruguay, October 13, 2011. 52 19