indicated that, “[r]egarding budgetary autonomy, this is precisely one of the innovations included in the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; in other words, for more than 10 years and for the first time in the republican history of the country, the Venezuelan Judiciary has complete budgetary autonomy.” 94. The representatives agreed with the Commission’s arguments (supra para. 90). In addition, regarding the State’s argument on teachings as a source of international law, they referred to the case of Reverón Trujillo, arguing that it was signed by Cecilia Medina Quiroga “in her capacity as Judge [and President of the Court] and not as an academic.” This judgment “reiterates that, in the case of provisional judges, it is required that they be able to enjoy the benefits of permanence until the legal decision that terminates their mandate.” 3.2. Considerations of the Court 95. The Court finds it appropriate to make some clarifications regarding certain arguments made by the State. First, the Court observes that, in the instant case, the procedure for the appointment of Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón in the last post she held as a temporary judge and the budgetary autonomy of the Judiciary in Venezuela are not in dispute; consequently, it will not analyze those arguments. Second, contrary to the State’s arguments regarding the long period of time during which Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón served as a judge, the Court observes that the alleged victim had only been in the post for three months when her appointment was annulled (supra para. 81). Third, the Court emphasizes that it is not competent to decide specifically the best institutional framework for guaranteeing judicial independence. The Court’s contentious jurisdiction is restricted to analyzing whether the American Convention has been violated in a particular case in which a specific institutional framework has been applied and, when appropriate, to determining the pertinent reparations. 96. Fourth, the Court observes that the expression “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law” embodied in Article 38(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice implies accepting that the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists are not, in themselves, a source of international law, but rather a tool for identifying the sources of law. In this regard, although the teachings on a specific issue serve a relevant function for the understanding or interpretation of the sources of law, those teachings do not, in themselves, create a standard or rule of law, especially when the Court has already established previously a line of case law in cases relating to judicial independence (infra paras. 97 to 100). Thus, what is appropriate to analyze is whether the arguments put forward by the State for the annulment of the appointment of provisional or temporary judges without, presumably, guaranteeing them a reasoned decision or a minimum stability in the exercise of the post are sound. 97. In this regard, the Court’s case law has indicated that the scope of judicial guarantees and effective judicial protection for judges must be analyzed in relation to the standards for judicial independence. In this regard, in the Reverón Trujillo case, the Court specified that, in contrast to other public officials, judges have guarantees owing to the necessary independence of the Judiciary, which the Court has understood as “essential for the exercise of judicial functions.”120 In this regard, the Court reiterates that one of the main purposes of the separation of public 120 Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Series C No. 107, para. 171; Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, para. 145, and Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 12, para. 67. 31