process […] so that her stability in the post is respected until the competitive examinations are held for the posts in her category and judicial circuit.” 151. According to the State, “in this case, it is not appropriate to reinstate” the victim “in the post that she held in the Judiciary, given her status as provisional judge and her entry into the justice system without sitting the corresponding competitive examination.” Consequently, it argued that “in this case, the rule of in integrum restitutio ‘cannot’ be applied, and therefore other form of reparation must be provided.” According to the State, “[a] measure of reparation that would be appropriate and that would provide an opportunity for allowing the re-entry” of Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón “to the exercise of judicial functions, consists in her registration for the next competitive examinations to be held, provided that […] she indicates her willingness to take part in the examination and meets the corresponding requirements.” 152. The Court notes that, according to the State, it is not possible to order the reinstatement of Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón as reparation, because she was serving as a temporary judge. However, in the preceding chapters, the Court found that provisional or temporary judges must enjoy all the benefits of permanence until a resolutive condition occurs that would terminate their mandate legally (supra para. 105). Also, regarding permanence in the exercise of public office and its relationship with the stability of judges, the Court reiterates its case law that the proper response to the arbitrary removal of a judge is their reinstatement.187 In the Reverón Trujillo case, the Court indicated that immediate reinstatement after an arbitrary removal is the least damaging measure to satisfy both the objectives of the judicial restructuring and the guarantee of tenure inherent in an independent judiciary.188 And that, “this is so because, otherwise, the States could remove the judges and thus intervene in the Judiciary without much expense or control.”189 Also, “this could instill fear in other judges, when they observe that their colleagues are removed and then not reinstated, even when the removal was arbitrary. This fear could also affect judicial independence, since it would encourage the judges to follow instructions or to abstain from challenging both the appointing and the sanctioning bodies.”190 153. Consequently, the Court declares that, in this case, the State must reinstate Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón to a post similar to the one she held, with similar remuneration, fringe benefits and seniority, to those she would have had today if she been reinstated immediately. The State must implement this measure within one year from notification of this judgment. The Court clarifies that the reinstatement should be with the same temporary status that Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón had when she was removed. However, this provisional status must be understood as the Court has described it in this judgment (supra para. 105). 154. Nevertheless, if for reasons beyond the victim’s control, the State cannot reinstate Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón in the Judiciary, it must pay her compensation, and the Court establishes this, in equity, at US$30,000 (thirty thousand United States dollars) or the equivalent in local currency, within six months of the decision 187 Cf. Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 12, para. 123. 188 The Court also considered that “the adverse effect on the rights of the provisional judge who was appointed following the victim’s removal was not excessive either, because it is reasonable that the resolutive condition of the appointment of the new provisional judge would be interpreted as depending on the validity of the removal of the previous judge. Cf. Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 12, para. 122. 189 Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 12, para. 81 190 Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 12, para. 81 47