analyze the seriousness of the conduct and the proportionality of the sanction.157 In the disciplinary sphere, it is essential to indicate the violation precisely and to submit arguments that allow it to be concluded that the comments provide sufficiently grounds to justify removing a judge from a post. In this case, although the Court could not conclude that the decision annulling Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón’s appointment was of a sanctioning nature (supra para. 116), the Court considers that its unjustified discretionary nature transformed the administrative decision of removal into an arbitrary decision that, by unduly affecting her right to job stability, violated the obligation to provide adequate grounds. 121. Moreover, since comments against Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón exist, they should have been clearly and expressly indicated so as to allow her to exercise fully her right to defense.158 Impeding the individual from exercising her right to defense from the onset of a procedure that involves her and in which the authorities order or execute actions that affect rights is empowering the State’s investigative authorities at the expense of fundamental rights of the individual. The right to defense obliges the State to treat the individual at all times as a true subject of the procedure, in the broadest sense of that concept, and not simply as an object of it.159 122. In sum, any provisional or temporary judge in Venezuela subject to a procedure to annul his or her appointment for non-disciplinary reasons should be made aware of the content of any “comments” made against them and their post so that, as appropriate, they can contest such comments. In addition, in this case, if the decision to remove Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón had been founded, the alleged victim could have better prepared the appeals filed to defend herself, eliminating the margin of error produced by conjecture. 123. Based on the above, the Court finds that the State failed to comply with its obligation to provide grounds for the decision to annul the appointment of Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón as a temporary judge and, consequently, its obligation to permit an adequate defense that granted her the possibility of contesting the comments made against her, all of which violates the due guarantees established in Article 8(1), in relation to Article 1(1) of the American Convention. 5. Effectiveness of the remedies 5.1. Arguments of the parties 124. The Commission argued that the appeal for annulment filed by the victim “not only failed to constitute an effective remedy to guarantee the rights violated by her removal by the Judicial Commission, but also perpetuated the said violation by keeping [Mrs.] Chocrón Chocrón completely unaware of the reasons for her removal.” 125. The representatives indicated that the State had abstained “from examining the administrative remedy contesting the removal filed before the courts [and] 157 Similarly, this Court ordered that the punishment be proportionate to the nature and seriousness of the crime being prosecuted, taking into account any attenuating and aggravating circumstances in the case. Cf. Case of Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C No. 133. 158 Cf. Case of Tibi v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114; Case of López Álvarez v. Honduras. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 1, 2006. Series C No. 141, para. 149, and Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 17, 2009. Series C No. 206, para. 28. 159 Cf. Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, supra note 158, para. 29, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, supra note 13, para. 154 39