146. This Court has established that the reparations must have a causal relationship with the facts of the case, the violations declared, and the damage proved, as well as with the measures requested to repair the respective damage. Therefore, the Court must examine these elements in order to rule appropriately and in keeping with the law.183 A. Injured Party 147. The Court reiterates that, according to Article 63(1) of the American Convention, the person who has been declared a victim of the violation of any right enshrined in the Convention is considered an injured party.184 Therefore, the Court considers Mercedes Chocrón Chocrón to be an “injured party”, and as victim of the violations declared in Chapter VII, she will be eligible for the reparations that the Court orders below. B. Integral measures of reparation: restitution and satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition 148. The Court will determine measures that seek to repair the non-pecuniary damage and that are not of a monetary nature, and will order measures of public scope or repercussion.185 149. International case law and, in particular, that of the Court have established repeatedly that the judgment constitutes per se a form of reparation.186 Nevertheless, considering the circumstances of the case sub judice, and in light of the effect on Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón owing to the changes in her situation, her expectations of professional development, and the other non-pecuniary consequences resulting from the violations of Articles 8(1) and 25(1), in relation to Article 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention, that have been declared to the detriment of the victim (supra paras. 123, 130 and 142), the Court finds it pertinent to order the following measures. 1. Restitution 150. The Commission and the representatives requested that the victim be reinstated in her post as Criminal Judge of First Instance of the Caracas Metropolitan Area Judicial Circuit, or, failing that, in a post of equal seniority and on the same judicial circuit, with the same remuneration, fringe benefits, and other pertinent legal consequences that would correspond to her if she had not been arbitrarily dismissed. In addition, the representatives requested “that, when her reinstatement has been agreed, the Judicial Commission of the Supreme Court of Justice, or any other authority assuming its functions, be ordered to refrain from removing [Mrs. Chocrón Chocrón] in a discretionary manner and without due 183 Cf. Case of Baldeón García v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 6, 2006. Series C No. 147, para. 177; Case of Abrill Alosilla et al. v. Peru, supra note 19, para. 89, and Case of Vera Vera et al. v. Ecuador, supra note 19, para. 107. 184 Cf. Case of the “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Reparations and costs. Judgment of May 25, 2001. Series C No. 76, para. 82; Case of Abrill Alosilla et al. v. Peru, supra note 19, para. 87, and Case of Vera Vera et al. v. Ecuador, supra note 19, para. 109. 185 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Reparations and costs. Judgment of May 26, 2001. Series C No. 77, para. 84; Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama, supra note 147, para. 261, and Case of Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador. Reparations and costs. Judgment of March 3, 2011. Series C No. 222, para. 125. 186 Cf. Case of Neira Alegría et al. v. Peru. Reparations and costs, Judgment of September 19, 1996. Series C No. 29, para. 56; Case of Abrill Alosilla et al. v. Peru, supra note 19, para. 132, and Case of Vera Vera et al. v. Ecuador, supra note 19, para. 135. 46