established. The case is different when it refers to the direct removal of a provisional or temporary official, without any disciplinary reason because, currently, that power is the responsibility of the Judicial Commission of the Supreme Court of Justice, by express delegation of the Plenum. It is worth noting that the Judicial Commission has the power both to appoint judges provisionally and to annul those appointments when the majority of its members choose to do so and provided that there is no disciplinary reason that obliges the body responsible for applying sanctions to take action. In this way, and based on this reasoning, the Political and Administrative Chamber does not waver in confirming the competence of the Judicial Commission of the Supreme Court of Justice to take action, within the indicated limits, as regards the appointment and removal of officials appointed on a provisional basis.117 88. With regard to the arguments concerning the absolute and total absence of procedure and the lack of justification for taking the decision, the SPA indicated that: As is recognized, any disciplinary sanction established in the Law on the Judicial Career must necessarily be preceded by the corresponding administrative procedure, whether the individual in question is a career official or an official who can be freely appointed and removed; while, when the removal of a judge who has been appointed provisionally is sought, the administrative decision ordering his separation from the post is not subject to any procedure, precisely because the judge’s guarantee of career stability and, consequently, the right to be subject to the respective procedure, are achieved through the competitive examination that is now enshrined in the Constitution as a sin qua non requirement for accessing the post of permanent or career judge. […] As can be seen, the appellant is in the position of those who have entered the Judiciary on a temporary basis, and her stability is therefore subject to the respective competitive examination process. This means that, in these circumstances, the claims made by the lawyer, Mercedes Chocrón, lack sustainable legal grounds, because, although she could be appointed to the post of judge of the First Instance Court of the Caracas Metropolitan Area Judicial Circuit by the Judicial Commission, this appointment must be interpreted as being temporary. In that regard, this Chamber finds that, just as the Judicial Commission had the power to appoint her directly without her having taken the respective competitive examination, it had the same competence to annul her appointment without the requirement to submit her to any procedure, or the obligation to provide specific legal grounds for her removal, given that her stability would always be subject to her taking the competitive examination to earn permanence in the post, which has not been verified in her case and which, therefore, does not permit changing the results obtained.”118 (Underlining added) 89. The Court observes that, in this case, the Judicial Commission and the SPA applied the criterion according to which the Judicial Commission is competent to annul the appointments of provisional and temporary judges without any kind of justification, taking into account that they are considered to be officials who can be freely removed. In view of the relationship of this issue with the violations alleged in the instant case, the first legal dispute that the Court will decide relates to the compatibility of this criterion with the American Convention. 3. The principle of judicial independence in relation to the free removal of provisional and temporary judges 3.1. Arguments of the parties 90. The Commission indicated that “in contrast to other public posts where a free appointment and removal arrangement may operate, in the case of judges the guarantee of stability in the exercise of their post should be reinforced.” It added that the guarantees of judicial independence “make no distinction between those appointed provisionally, temporarily or permanently.” In addition, it indicated that, in the case of provisional and temporary judges “the time frame or term for their 117 Judgment No. 01798 of the Political and Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, supra note 116, folios 496 and 497. 118 Judgment No. 01798 of the Political and Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, supra note 116, folio 498. 29