23 también en esto ha de practicarse el neminem laedere, y para ello, previamente, el suum cuique tribuere"87. 66. Well before its penetration into law, the concern to render respect and honour to the dead was already present in ancient cultures, - though the matter has been neglected, if not trivialized, in the "post-modern" world. From their original recognition in the most distinct cultures and religions, the duties of the living towards the dead was later on to find expression also in the domain of Law, both international and domestic, and this holds true also in our days. IX. From the Right to a Project of Life to the Right to a Life. Project of After- 67. Throughout the last seven years, the Inter-American Court has jurisprudentially asserted the right to the project of life, in particularly in the cases Loayza Tamayo (Reparations, 1998), Villagrán Morales and Others ("Street Children", Merits, 1999, and Reparations, 2001), and Cantoral Benavides (Reparations, 2001). The contribution of the Inter-American Court on this point, - which has parallels in the jurisprudence of certain national tribunals reflecting in comparative law, - has attracted the attention of, and has had a positive repercussion and receptiveness in, contemporary international legal doctrine. In addition, in other cases before the Inter-American Court, the right to the project of life has been invoked by the complaining parties before the Court, at individual level (cases Myrna Mack Chang, 2003; Brothers Gómez Paquiyauri, 2004; Carpio Nicolle and Others, 2004; and De la Cruz Flores, 2004), at family level (case Molina Theissen, 2004), and at community level (case of the Massacre of Plan de Sánchez, Reparations, 2004). 68. The present case of the Moiwana Community, in my view, takes us even further than the emerging right to the project of life. A couple of years ago this Court broke into new ground by asserting the existence of a damage to the project of life. The whole construction took into account, however, the living. In the present case, however, I can visualize, in the griefs of the N'djukas of the Moiwana village, a claim to the right to the project of after-life, taking into account the living in the relations with their dead, altogether. International Law in general, and the International Law of Human Rights in particular, cannot remain indifferent to the spiritual manifestations of human beings, such as the ones expressed in the proceedings before this Court in the present case of the Moiwana Community. 69. There is no cogent reason to remain in the world exclusively of the living. In the cas d'espèce, it appears to me that the Ndjukas are certainly well entitled to cherish their project of after-life, the encounter of each of them with their ancestors, the harmonious relationship between the living and their dead. Their outlook of life and after-life embodies fundamental values, long forgotten and lost by the sons and daughters of the industrial and the communications "revolutions" (or rather, involutions, from the spiritual perspective). 70. My years of experience in this Court have enabled me to adjudicate on cases which have raised issues which have gone, in fact, beyond this world of the living (such as the . N. Alcalá-Zamora y Torres, La Potestad Jurídica sobre el Más Allá de la Vida, Buenos Aires, EJEA, 1959, pp. 25-26, and cf. pp. 22 and 136. 87