DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE A.A. CANÇADO-TRINDADE 1. I regret that I cannot concur with the decision of the majority of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in this Judgment on Interpretation rendered in Case of the Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado-Alfaro et al.) v. Peru. The Court has declared the request for interpretation submitted by petitioners in the instant case inadmissible in its entirety based on the Court's –incorrect, in my opinion– view that such request does not raise any issue regarding the "meaning and scope" of its previous Judgment (of Nov. 24, 2006) on merits and reparations in this Case of the Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado-Alfaro et al.) v. Peru. 2. However, paragraph 7(a) of said request1 raises a question which I find to be most relevant, in connection with a matter I believe is directly related to the Judgment on merits and reparations rendered in the case at hand and, in addition, belongs –as I have argued within this Court– in the sphere of jus cogens: the issue of the right to a fair trial, to cover both formal and substantive aspects thereof, leading to the provision of justice by the judicial system, or justice being done. In stating the reasons behind my firm dissent from the majority of the Court in this Judgment, I will start by setting forth my preliminary considerations. I. Preliminary Considerations. 3. At the very beginning of my Separate Opinion to the Judgment on merits and reparations (of Nov. 24, 2006) rendered by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in this Case of the Dismissed Congressional Employees(Aguado-Alfaro et al.) v. Peru, I stated that I had concurred on said Judgment "although I am not satisfied with the decision in this case" (para. 1); right away, I added "some clarifications of a conceptual nature" (paras. 1-7), acting under the rushing pressure of the time limitations recently set on the Court’s decision-making process. I am not in the least surprised by petitioners' filing of a request for Interpretation of Judgment (brief of Feb. 5, 2007, pp. 1-2), even though they could have actually articulated it in a more careful, refined fashion. 4. Two further briefs were submitted to the Court in this proceeding for Interpretation of Judgment: one from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (of Aug. 1, 2007, pp. 13), wherein the Commission comes to the conclusion that the request "does not amount to a request for interpretation proper,” without providing, however, satisfactory reasons therefor or proving how such conclusion was reached, and another one from the respondent State (of Jul. 31, 2007, pp. 1-3), whereby the State did adequately provide the Court, using appropriate language, with all such data as it deemed relevant for the Court’s deliberation on this request for interpretation, without challenging the request itself. 5. Given that, in my opinion, in this Judgment on Interpretation the Inter-American Court has acted in an extremely summary and reluctant manner, failing to provide clarifications on paragraph 7(a) of petitioners’ request, which paragraph is concerned with an issue – access to justice – which I consider to be part of jus cogens, I will add this Dissenting Opinion to said Judgment, setting forth my reflections as the grounds supporting my position on the matter under discussion. My reflections will revolve around four issues arising from this Case of the 1 . In paragraph 7(a) of the aforementioned request, petitioners do, in connection with the fourth operative paragraph of the Judgment on merits and reparations rendered by the Inter-American Court, express their "concern" over who will guarantee them a simple, prompt and effective recourse (which requires that the State set up an independent and impartial body): whether the State itself or the body to be created by it by virtue of the aforementioned Judgment.