6 permits duly attributing participation in the facts and, if appropriate, the guilt of the State agents. Proceeding in any other way could violate articles 14, 16 and 20 of the Constitution, as well as articles 8, 24, and 25 of the Convention owing to failure to provide adequate judicial guarantees and protection, especially regarding the presumption of innocence. The State highlighted that “all the stages of the investigation in this case will be carried out exhaustively in order to elucidate the facts and thereby safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused,” and it indicated that “if the authorities do not respect these principles, which are also in keeping with the standards set by [the] Court, they would be violating the provisions of Mexican law and the guarantees established in the […] Convention.” 19. Fifth, Mexico reiterated the need for the Court to “clarify the meaning of paragraph 105 of the judgment in relation to paragraphs 104, 106, 107 and 161.” In this regard, it pointed out that, having established in paragraph 105 that it was not incumbent on the Court to establish individual responsibilities, the Court then “refers to the rape of Mrs. […] Rosendo Cantú.” According to the State, “the Court proceeded to evaluate the facts within its specific contentious jurisdiction in the area of human rights, as revealed by paragraph 107[.] This matter becomes important because, in paragraph 194, […] the Court itself emphasized […] the guiding principles that should be observed in criminal investigations into human rights violations. According to the provision that domestic legislation must be adapted to the Convention, it is important that the Court take into consideration that, once each of [those] principles has been complied with […] in the investigations into the rape allegedly committed by soldiers, […] it will not depend solely and exclusively on the Public Prosecution Service to determine whether or not a crime has been committed, […] but rather on the ruling that, if appropriate, is issued by the competent judicial authority.” Consequently, the judgment should not “be interpreted as a order or instruction that necessarily leads to the criminal prosecution of eight soldiers […] or imposing punishment on the eight individuals referred to in the judgment because, in addition to the fact that the Court cannot individualize responsibilities, it did not order these measures.” The State therefore requested that “the scope of paragraphs 104, 106 and 161 be clarified, both because [the] Court did not establish individual criminal responsibilities (because it confined its ruling to its contentious jurisdiction) and because, in the tenth operative paragraph, it ordered that the investigations be conducted and, as appropriate, criminal proceedings be filed against those found responsible so that the competent judicial authority could rule on the existence of criminal responsibilities and, if appropriate, impose the legal punishments and consequences.” The State concluded that the judgment “is unclear” and therefore requested clarification of whether “it should be understood in the sense that the investigations and the criminal prosecution must have the specific sole and unequivocal result of punishing eight soldiers.” 20. Finally, sixth, the State affirmed that it was “concerned […] that the Court’s decision entails a violation of the principle of the presumption of innocence established in Article 8(2) of the Convention, […] given that paragraph 105 in relation to paragraphs 104, 106, 107 and 161 suggests that, based on the judgment, the domestic public prosecution and judicial authorities must necessarily seek out and punish eight guilty parties.” 21. The Inter-American Commission recalled that for an international court, the standards for appraising evidence are less formal than under domestic legal systems and that, in its proceedings, the Inter-American Court can find indications of the participation of agents that entail the State’s responsibility. It considered that the