3 10. The petitioner said that if something had been considered illegal in the process followed for his appointment and re-election, the Congress lacked the jurisdictional authority to declare it illegal and the only legal channel for doing so would have been through a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of his appointment, which would have been decided ultimately by the corresponding courts. He stated that the only other valid option for the Congress under Ecuadorian law for removing a member of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal before the end of his term would have been impeachment, but he had never been charged with any irregularity nor were there any other grounds for that action. The petitioner said that the declaration of “vacancy” used to fire him is not a form of termination that is regulated by Ecuadorian law and it was therefore illegal. 11. With respect to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the petitioner said that he had been denied access to domestic remedies and that at the time of the facts members of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court had been dismissed, so there were no tribunals administering justice independently and impartially. He specifically mentioned that he had been prevented from filing an amparo lawsuit for protection of his constitutional rights by a resolution of December 2, 2004, specifying the new composition of the Constitutional Court. 12. The petitioner argued that the purpose of said resolution was to preclude the affected members from filing amparo lawsuits. He said that the unconstitutionality lawsuit suggested in the resolution of December 2, 2004, was not an appropriate or effective remedy for challenging the act that removed him from his position, because a person cannot do it as an individual; it is necessary to have 1,000 signatures or the intervention of the Public Defender; furthermore, he stated that it was not an action for immediate protection of human rights, and that it was not capable of remedying the violation, noting that when he was terminated, the Congress had also terminated the members of the Constitutional Court, so there was no impartial or independent authority to which he could resort. He added that administrative litigation was not an appropriate or effective remedy either, because in the end it would be decided by a Supreme Court that was not independent or impartial, and because this process does not challenge political or government acts. B. Position of the State 13. The State said that resolution R-25-160 is an administrative act regulated by and emanating from a competent authority, because Article 130.1 of the Constitution of 1998 established that the Congress is responsible for naming the members of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, excusing them, and designating their replacements. 14. With respect to the petition’s admissibility, the State said that the petitioner had not exhausted domestic remedies, because he could have filed administrative litigation to challenge the congressional resolution that terminated his services, since such an action can be filed by anyone to challenge an act that is contrary to his rights or direct interests. 15. It said that the petitioner could also have filed an amparo suit for protection of his constitutional rights, regulated by Ecuador’s Constitutional Control Law; or in any case could have met the legal requirements for filing a case challenging constitutionality, if he had felt that his removal was unconstitutional or arbitrary. 16. Finally, the State said that the petitioner could file a lawsuit for protection under Article 88 of the current Constitution and the Rules of Procedure for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the