State did not contest the information presented by the representatives and, in its subsequent reports, referred to laws it had adopted to implement the decision of the CCJ (infra considerandum 15). 10. Based on the documentation provided by the representatives, the Court notes that, on June 27, 2018, the CCJ handed down a judgment in the cases of Jabari Sensimania Nervais v. The Queen and Dwayne Omar Severin v. The Queen,26 in which it concluded that section 2 of the Offences Against the Person Act was contrary to the Constitution of Barbados insofar as it established the mandatory death penalty.27 The majority vote recognized that this ruling could affect other people who had been sentenced to death under the said law or whose death sentence had been commuted to life imprisonment, indicating its view that said persons should “be brought with reasonable expedition before the Supreme Court for re-sentencing”. 11. The Court appreciates that the CJC’s decision contains provisions that concur with the Inter American Court’s consistent case law concerning the incompatibility of the mandatory death penalty with the obligations derived from the American Convention. Indeed, the majority opinion expressly took into account the Judgment delivered by this Tribunal in this case ans the case of Boyce et al. v. Barbados, as well as the 2011 joint Order on monitoring compliance with judgments delivered in these two cases in 2011, to state that “Barbados had already accepted that it had an obligation to modify its legislation to remove the mandatory imposition of the death penalty in conformity with international law provisions by which it was bound”. In this regard, the said judgment indicates that: In 2007, the [Inter-American Court] in the case of Boyce et al. v Barbados ruled inter alia that through the imposition of the mandatory sentence of death […] Barbados was in breach of the Convention. The [Court] found that the ‘failure of Barbados to amend or invalidate section 2 of the Offences Against the Person Act so as to bring its laws into compliance with the American Convention constituted a per se violation of Article 2 of the Convention’ and that [s]ection 26 of the Constitution effectively denied citizens in general, and the alleged victims of violation in particular, the right to seek judicial protection against violations of their right to life. In 2009 the same [C]ourt, in the case of Da[C]osta Cadogan v Barbados, again found inter alia that Barbados was in breach of its obligations under the Convention as it related to section 2 of the [Offences Against the Person Act] and section 26 of the Constitution and made similar remedial orders. In its order monitoring compliance with judgments in Boyce and [DaCosta] Cadogan of November 21, 2011 the [Court] referred to the fact that Barbados had accepted and given undertakings to the [C]ourt to comply with [its] rulings. 12. In this sense, it is notable that the CCJ’s judgment remarked that the imposition of the mandatory death penalty was arbitrary and deprived individuals of the most fundamental human rights, “without considering whether the death sentence as an exceptional form of punishment was appropriate in the particular circumstances of an individual’s case”, and emphasized that “they [did] not believe that the trial process stop[ped] at the conviction of the accused”, but that “the principle of a fair trial [had to] be accorded to the sentencing stage too”. 26 Cf. Judgment of the Caribbean Court of Justice in the cases of Jabari Sensimania Nervais v. The Queen (CCJ Appeal No. BBCR2017/002) and Dwayne Omar Severin v. The Queen (CCJ Appeal No. BBCR2017/03) of June 27, 2018 (annex to the written observations of the representatives of July 6, 2018). The cases related to individuals who had been convicted of the crime of murder and sentenced to the mandatory death penalty in Barbados. 27 Specifically, the CCJ concluded that this section was incompatible with sections 11(c), 12(1), 15(1) and 18(1) of the Constitution of Barbados. -6-