violation of that recognition entails categorically denying the possibility of being the possessor of the fundamental civil rights and obligations. 229 188. This right is a parameter for determining whether or not an individual is the possessor of the rights in question, and whether he can exercise them, 230 so that the violation of this recognition renders the individual vulnerable before the State or private individuals. 231 Thus, the content of the right to recognition of juridical personality refers to the corresponding general obligation of the State to provide the legal means and conditions to ensure that this right can be exercised freely and fully by its possessors or, as applicable, the obligation not to violate this right. 232 Over and above the fact that the disappeared person cannot continue enjoying and exercising others and, eventually, all the rights which he also possesses, his disappearance seeks not only one of the most severe ways of removing an individual from the whole sphere of law, but also denies his very existence and leaves him in a sort of limbo or situation of legal indetermination before society and the State. 233 In this case, the Court considers that Narciso González Medina was placed in a situation of legal indetermination, which prevented him from possessing or exercising effectively his rights in general, which resulted in a violation of his right to recognition of juridical personality. 189. The representatives also alleged that the forced disappearance involved a violation of Mr. González Medina’s right of “access to justice,” because the definition of the crime of forced disappearance includes preventing the victim from the “exercise of the pertinent legal remedies and procedural guarantees.” Therefore, they indicated that “the disappearance of Narciso González meant that he could not have recourse to the effective legal remedies that corresponded to him to protect himself from the violations to which he was subjected.” 190. In this regard, the Court reiterates that, in cases of forced disappearance of persons, the victim is left in a situation of legal indetermination that obstructs and annuls his possibility to possess his rights in general, and to exercise them effectively, and this constitutes one of the most serious forms of non-compliance with the State’s obligation to respect and guarantee human rights. 234 The Court has recognized that forced disappearance is a practice with the deliberate intention of removing the individual from the exercise of the pertinent legal remedies and procedural guarantees. This means that the person cannot exercise his right to be heard, the guarantee of judicial control of detention, and access to an effective remedy should his rights be violated. This violation makes it impossible to exercise other rights, whether civil or political 235 so that, in fact, the disappeared person 229 Cf. Case of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala. Merits, supra note 56, para. 179, and Case of Torres Millacura et al. v. Argentina, supra note 52, para. 104. 230 Cf. Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of March 29, 2006. Series C No. 146, para. 188, and Case of Torres Millacura et al. v. Argentina, supra note 52, para. 105. 231 Cf. Case of the Yean and Bosico Girls v. Dominican Republic. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 8, 2005. Series C No. 130, para. 179, and Case of Torres Millacura et al. v. Argentina, supra note 52, para. 105. 232 Cf. Case of Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, supra note 50, para. 156, and Case of Torres Millacura et al. v. Argentina, supra note 52, para. 105. 233 Cf. Case of Anzualdo Castro v. Peru, supra note 150, para. 57, and Case of Torres Millacura et al. v. Argentina, supra note 52, para. 105. 234 Cf. Case of Anzualdo Castro v. Peru, supra note 150, para. 101, and Case of Torres Millacura et al. v. Argentina, supra note 52, para. 106. 235 Cf. Case of Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala, supra note 52, para. 100, and Case of Ibsen Cárdenas and Ibsen Peña v. Bolivia, supra note 49, para. 100. 62