accused, with the death or disappearance” of Mr. González Medina, it is a “condition sine qua non to establish that he is disappeared,” and this had not been established either legally or judicially. According to this judge, the result of this is “the absence of evidence or indications that prove a violation which can be attributed to them, when the disappearance of his life has not been established.” 262 Similarly, he stated that “the possible establishment of the juridical concept of murder in the first degree or assassination is improbable in a proceeding where not even the disappeared status of Professor Narciso González has been established, because, in order for this legal concept to exist, not only is the pre-existence of a human life essential, but also that this has been destroyed, and that someone has been accused of this, a situation that has not been possible in this proceeding.” 263 228. As can be seen, the said reasoning of the Investigating Judge reveals the failure to understand the phenomenon of forced disappearance and, consequently, the logical lines of investigation that should have guided his inquiries. It should be recalled that one of the elements of forced disappearance is precisely the refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or provide information on the whereabouts. In addition, this Court has established that the alleged victims’ next of kin are not obliged to file domestic remedies that are inadequate to determine the whereabouts of the disappeared person, clarify the facts, and establish the individual responsibilities deriving from them, 264 which is applicable to the exercise of a civil action to declare that someone is a “disappeared person.” The Court considers that subordinating the attribution of criminal responsibilities to the prior filing of a civil action to declare Mr. González Medina a “disappeared person” constituted an obstacle to the effective investigation of what happened and the identification and punishment of those responsible. 229. Other considerations of the Investigating Judge that reveal the absence of due diligence in the investigation are evident when he referred to the reasons why the crime of abduction could not be attributed, stating that: […] The investigation does not reveal indications that the accused […] ordered the detention of Professor Narciso González, in order to ask for a reward or ransom consisting in a sum of money from the victim, family or authorities. […] that, in the investigation it has not been shown that the accused […] abducted Professor Narciso González in the conditions established by law. […] That, to the foregoing is added that the family and plaintiffs have not advised this Court that, following the disappearance of Professor Narciso González, they were required to pay sums of money for the release of Professor Narciso González. 265 230. These findings by the Investigating Judge reveal the lack of understanding of the nature of forced disappearance. It should be recalled that one of the elements that distinguishes forced disappearance from other crimes, such as abduction, is the refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or to provide information on the victim’s whereabouts, so that, evidently, its purpose is not to ask for a reward as a requirement for releasing the person. 231. In addition, it is worth underlining that, in the said ruling of August 2001, the Investigating Judge concluded that the person who had been the Armed Forces Secretary of 262 August 24, 2001, ruling of the Investigating Court, supra note 105, folios 4541 and 4542. 263 August 24, 2001, ruling of the Investigating Court, supra note 105, folio 4558. 264 Cf. Case of Gomes Lund et al. (Guerrilha do Araguaia) v. Brazil, supra note 53, para. 46. 265 August 24, 2001, ruling of the Investigating Court, supra note 105, folio 4548. 72