11 40. In the matter of reparations, the applicable provision is Article 63(1) of the American Convention, which codifies one of the fundamental principles of general international law, and is repeatedly applied in case law. (Factory as Chorzów, Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 8, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No 9, p. 21 and Factory at Chorzów, Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p 29; Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 184). This is the sense in which this Court has applied that provision (inter alia, Neira Alegría Case, Reparations, (Article 63(1) American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of September 19, 1996, Series C. No. 29, para. 36; Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Reparations, (Article 63(1) American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of January 29, 1997, Series C. No. 31, para. 15; Garrido and Baigorria, Reparations, (Article 63(1) American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of August 27, 1998, Series C. No. 39, para. 40; Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations, (Article 63(1) American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of November 27, 1998, Series C. No. 42, para. 84, and Castillo Páez Case, Reparations, (Article 63(1) American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of November 27, 1998, Series C. No. 43, para. 50). When a wrongful act occurs that is imputable to a State, the State incurs international responsibility for the violation of international law, and thus incurs a duty to make reparation. 41. Reparations is a generic term that covers the different ways (restitutio in integrum, compensation, satisfaction, and assurances of guarantees that the violations will not be repeated, among others) in which a State can redress the international responsibility it has incurred. 42. The obligation to make reparations established by international courts is governed, as has been universally accepted, by international law in all its aspects: scope, nature, forms, and the determination of beneficiaries, none of which the respondent State may alter by invoking its domestic law ( See, inter alia, Neira Alegría et al. Case, Reparations, supra 40, para. 37; Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Reparations, supra 40, para. 16; Garrido and Baigorria Case, Reparations, supra 40, para. 42; Loayza Tamayo, Reparations, supra 40, para. 86; Castillo Páez Case, Reparations, supra 40, para. 49). VI PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 43. The Court deems that it is necessary to first study the effects of the failure to submit, on the part of the State, a brief on reparations. 44. During the public hearing held by the Tribunal, Mr. Suárez Rosero, through his representatives, stated that the Ecuadorian State was granted a time period to answer the brief on reparations [submitted by Mr. Suárez Rosero]. Subsequently, the Illustrious Court, by its President, granted it an additional period to respond to that brief. Nevertheless, the Ecuadorian State did not submit any response, neither within the initial time period, nor within the extended period. [...] We believe that this Court should apply a principle of International law set forth in the Statute of the International Court of Justice as well as in the Regulations of the