Article 7(5) of the Convention, exhaustion of domestic remedies refers to remedies available to challenge the reasonableness of a detention, not to examine the merits of a case. It further asserted that “the denial of the benefit of release is not final inasmuch as it does not preclude the possibility of review when requested by the party.” 36. Later, during the processing of the case with the Commission, on several occasions the petitioner reported that he had applied for release on “personal recognizance” based on Articles 379, subparagraph 6, under Article 701 of the Code of Criminal Procedure because the time period stipulated in Articles 1 and 7 of Law 24,390 had expired.23 The courts denied all his petitions seeking release. In previous cases, the Commission has found that a request for release based on lack of grounds to justify continued preventive detention is an effective remedy against protracted preventive detention.24 The following is a narrative of the various occasions when Mr. Bayarri availed himself of that remedy and the State’s position thereon. i. The first time, the parties informed the Commission that on March 30, 1995, the Federal Appeals Chamber upheld the lower court’s ruling that denied the petition for release. The extraordinary appeal that the petitioner filed was also denied by the Appellate Court on June 22, 1995. On December 5, 2000, the State alleged that the petitioner had not exhausted the federal remedy provided for in Law 48 whereby the highest court in the land would decide the matter. ii. The second time he applied for release, the parties informed the Commission that on December 18, 1995, the magistrate on the bench of Federal Criminal and Correctional Court of First Instance Nº 6 of the Federal Capital denied the request for release. On January 25, 1996, the Federal Criminal and Correctional Appellate Court dismissed the appeal filed by the defense on the grounds that it was filed late. By note of February 10, 1996, the State alleged that a reading of the decision reveals that “while the judge does not accept the defense’ argument regarding release based on an interpretation of Law 24.390, it is also true that he does not rule out the application of the law when appropriate.” The State points out that the legal norm stipulates that every day of preventive detention will be double counted when said detention exceeds a period of two to three and a half years, depending on the case concerned. On December 5, 2000, the State alleged that the petitioner’s appeal had been denied on the grounds that the deadline had passed. iii. On September 23, 1998, the petitioner alleged that the Court of First Instance had arbitrarily denied another request for release on September 12, 1996. On October 31, 1996, the corresponding Appellate Court upheld the lower court’s ruling. On December 9, 1998, the State alleged that if the petitioner believed that his situation had changed since the time his petition for release had been denied, then he should exhaust the remedies under domestic law, in accordance with Article 46 of the Convention. Concerning this remedy, on December 5, 2000, the State alleged that the petitioner had failed to exhaust the federal remedy provided for in Law 48, allowing the highest court in the land to decide the matter. iv. On August 9, 1999, the State informed the Commission that the petitioner had filed his most recent application for release on January 9, 1997, which the court of first instance denied the following day. The court of second instance upheld the lower court’s ruling on March 5, 1997. The State has also alleged that the petitioner did not exercise another remedy available to him to exhaust remedies at the federal level. On February 17, 2000, the State alleged that if the petitioner felt that his situation had changed since his application for release was 23 Law 24.390, enacted in November 1994, was regarded as progress by the Commission, which stated the following in Report Nº 2/97, par. 61, point (i): “The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights acknowledges the significant progress achieved by Argentina with approval of the law establishing limits on the duration of preventive detention.” 24 See: Report Nº 12/96, Argentina, Cases 11.245, decision of March 1, 1996, and Report Nº 2/97, Argentina, Cases 11.205, 11.236, 11.238, 11.239, 11.242, 11.243, 11.244, 11.247, 11.248, 11.249, 11.251, 11.254, 11.255, 11.257, 11.258, 11.261, 11.263, 11.305, 11.320, 11.326, 11.330, 11.499, and 11.504, decision of March 11, 1997. 11