9. They alleged that, on March 19, 1996, although the strike’s legitimacy had not yet been decided on by the First Chamber of the Appeals Court, certain workers of the STOJ went on strike, which extended to April 2 of that same year. They indicated that, as a result, the Judiciary decided to stop paying the wages of the striking employees. They alleged that, in view of this measure, the Union filed a motion for protection on constitutional grounds (amparo) with the Constitutional Court, which ruled in its favor on April 2, 1996, ordering said Court to pay the wages that had been withheld from the employees during March 1996, provided they went back to work immediately. They pointed out that, because of the above, the striking employees went back to work on April 8, 1996. 10. The petitioners pointed out that, on May 13, 1996, the First Chamber of the Labor and Social Welfare Appeals Court ruled that the strike action spearheaded by the STOJ between March 19 and April 2, 1996 was illegitimate and that the Supreme Court of Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia—CSJ) had 20 days to determine who had participated in the strike and terminate their contracts. It indicated that the CSJ drafted a list bearing various inconsistencies, because persons who had not participated in the strike appeared on the list. 11. The petitioners argued that, as of the year 1996 and for more than two years thereafter, they filed a series of appeals to recuse all the chambers of the Appeals Courts that had heard the proceedings on the strike as they deemed that their impartiality had been compromised because they were answerable to the Supreme Court of Justice. 12. They indicated that, as a result of the above, there was no competent court to settle the dispute, because the Supreme Court of Justice, which should have resolved the recusals, was itself involved in the dispute. 13. They indicated that, on December 15, 1997, a series of modifications to the Basic Law on the Judiciary, which established, among other matters, that recusal does not provide the effects of suspension, thus making it possible for the judging court to continue hearing the proceedings even when it has been recused and added that the judgments of the chamber of the Appeals Court in the matter of procedural amendments were final and not subject to appeal. 14. They stated that, on March 17, 1999, the CSJ, when enforcing the new Law on the Judiciary, refused to hear the case because the action being challenged had been ruled upon by a court comprising several judges (tribunal colegiado) and therefore it was not susceptible to appeal. They pointed out that, in view of this refusal, on July 8, 1999, they filed an appeal for amparo, which was turned down by the Constitutional Court. On August 23, 1999, the judgment ruling that the strike was unlawful was upheld. 15. They indicated that, on September 1, 1999, the CSJ proceeded to move forward with the dismissal of 508 employees. They alleged that, among them, there were members of the Judiciary who benefited from the principle of job security because they were members of the Union’s Executive Committee and Advisory Board. They pointed out that, among the persons dismissed, there were employees who did not participate in the strike. They indicated that, on September 24, 1999, they filed an appeal for amparo with the Constitutional Court, which turned it down on February 29, 2000. 16. They also indicated that, after a series of protests, in November 1999, the Judiciary proceeded to rehire more than 400 former employees of the 508 who had been dismissed for having allegedly participated in the strike. 17. They alleged the need to modify the regulatory framework for labor in order to provide employees of the Judiciary with procedures different from those of other government workers, because in this case judge and employer are the same person. 18. As for the law, the petitioners argued that the state violated their rights to a fair trial and judicial protection, as well as their rights to freedom of association and equality before the law. 2