freedom of thought and of expression recognized in […] the Chilean Constitution, as well as at the international level in the American Convention on Human Rights. Accordingly, this Supreme Court observes the pertinence of reconsidering the disciplinary measure applied to Judge Urrutia in 2005, finding that this did not constitute an institutional response in keeping with the basic tenets of the democratic rule of law and, therefore, annuls it. Regarding the recommendation that compensation should be provided, pursuant to the functions and authority established for this Supreme Court in the Constitution, the examination of this matter will be postponed until a later date, when it has received the corresponding proposal from its President.”69 88. In accordance with this decision, on March 12, 2019, any reference to the said sanction was removed from the personnel record of Judge Urrutia Laubreaux.70 89. In this case, as indicated by the Supreme Court of Chile, the academic paper written by Mr. Urrutia Laubreaux constituted an exercise of his freedom of expression. This Court considers that, although the freedom of expression of those who exercise jurisdictional functions may be subject to greater restrictions than that of other individuals, this does not mean that any expression by a judge can be restricted. Thus, it is not in keeping with the American Convention to sanction the views included in an academic paper on a general topic and not on a specific case, such as those set out by the presumed victim in this case. 90. The Court also recalls that, under the Convention, state responsibility can only be required at the international level after the State has had the opportunity to recognize, as appropriate, a violation of a right and to redress the harm caused by its own means. 71 This is based on the principle of complementarity that permeates the inter-American system of human rights; a system that, as stated in the preamble to the American Convention, is complementary and intended to contribute to the protection offered by the domestic law of the States of the Americas. Thus, the State is the principal guarantor of the human rights of the individual, so that, if an act occurs that violates those rights, it is the State itself that has the obligation to resolve the matter at the domestic level and, as appropriate, make reparation, before having to respond before international instances such as the inter-American system for the protection of human rights, and this derives from the subsidiary nature of the international proceedings in relation to the national systems that guarantee human rights.72 91. The said complementary nature of the international jurisdiction means that the protection system established by the American Convention on Human Rights does not substitute for the national jurisdictions; rather, it complements them.73 This means that, under the inter-American system, there is a dynamic and complementary control of the Conventionbased obligation of the States to respect and to ensure human rights, together with the domestic authorities (the primary persons obligated) and the international instances (in a complementary manner), so that national and international decision-making criteria and protection mechanisms can be molded and adapted to each other. Thus, the Court’s case law 69 Supreme Court of Justice of Chile. Decision of May 29, 2018 (evidence file, folios 777 and 778). Cf. Statement made by Daniel David Urrutia Laubreaux during the public hearing held in this case, and final oral arguments of the representatives. 70 Cf. Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits and reparations. Judgment of November 30, 2012. Series C No. 259, para. 143, and Case of Petro Urrego v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 8, 2020. Series C No. 406, para. 104. 71 Cf. Case of Acevedo Jaramillo et al. v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 7, 2006. Series C No. 144, para. 66, and Case of Petro Urrego v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, supra, paras. 102 and 103. 72 Cf. Case of Acevedo Jaramillo et al. v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 66, and Case of Petro Urrego v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 103. 73 22