4 protection established in Article 25 of the American Convention insofar as the alleged victim did not have access to an effective remedy to protect his rights. In that context, they argue that the remedies pursued were rejected for superfluous reasons. 14. The petitioners allege that the State is responsible for violating its duty to adopt provisions of domestic law established in Article 2 of the American Convention on introducing a discriminatory provision such as Article 117 of the Rules on Military Discipline. They also allege that said rule equates homosexual conduct with criminal conduct such as the unlawful use, trafficking, and commercialization of drugs or narcotics. Finally, they allege that the resolution adopted by the State by which it suspended the alleged victim and subsequently discharged him from active duty in the Armed Force had deprived him of his right to work and entailed, therefore, a violation of Article XIV of the American Declaration. 15. As for complying with the requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies established at Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention, the petitioners allege that the decision by the Constitutional Court of February 4, 2002, reported March 4, 2002, exhausted domestic remedies, which would meet said requirement. They argue that in the event that the Commission considers that the amparo action did not exhaust domestic remedies, the exceptions to the prior exhaustion requirement established at Article 46(2) of the American Convention would apply. 16. As for the State’s argument on the domestic remedies that the alleged victim should pursue in response to the administrative act that ordered his discharge (see infra The State), the petitioners argue that the discharge was a consequence of the resolution of the Court of Law of the Fourth Military Zone of January 17, 2001. They allege that they pursued “the only remedy available under domestic legislation in an administrative venue,” i.e. a motion of appeal (recurso de apelación) before the Council of Superior Officers of the Armed Force, which was dismissed on July 18, 2001. They further argue that the resolution of the Council of Superior Officers became final in keeping with Article 200 of the Law on Personnel of the Armed Forces. 17. As for the contentious-administrative remedies indicated by the State (see infra The State), the petitioners argue that Article 6(c) of the Law on the ContentiousAdministrative Jurisdiction indicates: “The following do not correspond to the contentiousadministrative jurisdiction: … (c) Matters that arise in relation to the political acts of the Government, such as those that affect the defense of the national territory, international relations, the internal security of the State, and the organization of the Armed Forces….” In this respect, they allege that the resolution of the Court of Law of the Fourth Military Zone refers to the organization of the Armed Forces, thus the contentious-administrative remedy would not be appropriate for protecting the legal situation of the alleged victim. They argue that in view of the limitation established in the Law on the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction it would not have been possible to obtain a judgment of last instance and therefore there would be no possibility of filing a motion for cassation. In summary, the petitioners argue that as long as the resolution of the Court of Law of the Fourth Military Zone continues in force, any challenge of other acts that derive it is totally ineffective and irrelevant. B. The State 18. The State argues that the petitioners’ claim is inadmissible since the remedies provided for in the domestic jurisdiction have not been exhausted, as required by the American Convention. Specifically, it alleges that Ecuador’s military legislation provides for two types of procedures for separating one of its members on active duty, one administrative for committing disciplinary breaches, and another criminal for committing some act classified