84).” Thus it indicated that “clarification is required concerning the relationship between its findings and the amount resulting from that exercise.” 22. Similarly, the State indicated that, “given that the expert opinion of architect Estupiñán is the only one that takes into account the series of legal constraints on the land at the time of the expropriation, which did not grant the property “development possibilities,” and taking into account that the method of calculation used in that opinion is, by all accounts, the closest to the Court’s reasoning, the Ecuadorian State does not find that the elements used by the Court to arrive at an amount three times greater than that of the expert opinion are sufficiently clear [and] considers that the ‘cause and effect’ relationship between the findings and the determination of the amount can be interpreted in many different ways and lacks clarity.” Lastly, the State indicated that it “considers that the exercise of assessing general and private interests has not been developed in the […] judgment.” Consequently, it asked the Court “to define with absolute clarity the way in which it arrived at the amount established in paragraph 84 of the judgment.” 23. The representatives indicated that, “[t]hrough its request for interpretation, the State is seeking that the Court modify its judgment, which is contrary to the norms that govern the proceedings before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The State […] again raises factual issues that the Court has already decided and indicates clearly its disagreement with the judgment delivered on March 3, 2011, which means that this request is also inadmissible […].” Consequently, the representatives asked the Court to reject the request, “as it is not addressed at an interpretation, but on the contrary seeks to modify the judgment regarding which it says it seeks an interpretation.” 24. For its part, as previously indicated, the Inter-American Commission did not add any further arguments to those indicated in paragraph 5 of this judgment. Considerations of the Court 25. In section B) 1 of the judgment on reparations and costs, the Court analyzed the measures, expert opinions and normative in the domestic and international proceedings.” In addition, in section B) 2, entitled “Determination of fair compensation by this Court,” it analyzed the different valuations provided to the Court (paras. 63 to 66 of the judgment). In this regard, the Court concluded that: […] according to the essential characteristics of the property, as well as the body of evidence, it can be concluded that it is a piece of rural land, owing to the absence of buildings and certain uses of the land, with particular characteristics owing to its urban location, on which limitations were imposed as regards its use and enjoyment in order to achieve environmental, ecological, and recreational benefits, which contribute to the preservation of the natural resources to the benefit of society, all of this evaluated to establish its fair price […]. […] Based on this, when the declaration of public interest was issued on May 13, 1991, the 5 property already had legal limitations on its use, and therefore its market value had decreased. 26. It is clear that, in the said judgment, all the expert opinions in the case file before the Court were assessed, without the Court considering any of them as decisive. Hence, paragraph 81 of the judgment established that: Based on the claims for reparations, the Court weighed all the evidence provided by the parties, as well as the work and conclusions of the various expert opinions, which differ and are even 5 Cf. Case of Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador. Reparations and costs. Judgment of the Court of March 3, 2011. Series C No. 222, paras. 73 and 82. 6