Arguments of the parties 13. The State indicated to the Court “the need for an international ruling on how the local proceedings should proceed with regard to the purpose of the litigation that, in a subsidiary manner, was being examined by the Inter-American Court. This was because, on April 7, 2010, […] the legal proceedings continued by means of a new hearing before the First Civil Chamber of the Provincial Court of Pichincha, where the representatives of the Salvador Chiriboga family had returned to present a financial claim […].” According to the State, the Quito Municipality “rejected the arguments of the representatives of Mrs. Salvador [Chiriboga], indicating that, since the purpose of the litigation was the same as that of the case before the Inter-American Court and the domestic proceedings, the Provincial Court should recuse itself and declare that the Inter-American Court has jurisdiction on this issue, to the extent that it is a subsidiary system.” 14. Consequently, the State asked the Court to expand the explanation of paragraphs 48, 61 and 93 of the judgment “in order to make it conclusive for the parties that the domestic proceedings cannot continue owing to the subsidiary nature of the inter-American system, because, by its nature, it is a system that functions solely and exclusively when the ineffectiveness of the national institutions or excessive delays in the administration of justice have been proved, as was determined in the judgment on merits in the Salvador Chiriboga case.” 15. In this regard, the representatives stated that, on March 31, 2011, immediately after being notified of the judgment, they submitted a brief from Mrs. Salvador Chiriboga to the First Civil and Mercantile Chamber of the Provincial Court of Justice indicating that, in the judgment handed down on March 3, 2011, “the amount of the fair compensation for her piece of property that was subject to expropriation [had been] established[,...] according to the provisions of paragraphs 84 and 101 of [the said judgment[.] Therefore, she “requested that Chamber to declare this so, because the central issue had been decided by the international court. Consequently, [the Chamber] should order that the case be closed.” According to the representatives, based on the said brief, the First Chamber of the Provincial Court of Pichincha, “in a decision of April 28, 2011, transferred the case to the Municipality [of the Metropolitan District] of Quito and to the Attorney General’s Office [and, in briefs presented on May 4, 2011],” they agreed the following: “(a) that now that the issue of fair compensation has been decided by the Inter-American Court, the case cannot continue at the domestic level, and (b) that all that is required is an order by the Chamber to transfer ownership of the property to the municipal entity so that it has a title deed.” 16. Based on the above, the representatives considered that, “[t]he effects of the judgment of March 3, 2011, handed down by the Court are clear to the State. Indeed, Mrs. Salvador Chiriboga’s representatives, who also act as her lawyers at the domestic level, agree fully that the Provincial Court is obliged to close the case, because the dispute that existed has ended with the judgment on reparations [and costs]. Thus, it is clear to all the parties that there is no reason to continue the domestic proceedings. In these circumstances, all the parties agree that the case should be closed […].” However, the State did not mention this in its request for interpretation. Therefore, the representatives indicated that “it does not make any sense for […] the State to maintain that an interpretation of the judgment is required when its conduct reveals that it understands fully the effects and consequences of the latter. In view of the foregoing, it is evident that there are no grounds for the Court to proceed to interpret this point. 4