employees of the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic of Peru, they were all
enrolled in this retirement and pension plan.
6. With passage of Decree Law Nº 25,597, dated July 7, 1992, and by virtue of Supreme
Decree Nº 036-93-EF of March 17, 1993, payment of their pensions was transferred to the
Ministry of Economy and Finance. With that, the petitioners were denied their right to have
their pensions pegged to the salaries and bonuses of the active staff members of the
Comptroller General’s Office; instead, their pensions were pegged to the pay scale at the
Ministry of Economy and Defense.
7. The petitioners further contend that on May 27, 1993, they teamed up with the Association
of Discharged and Retired Staff of the Office of the Comptroller General–of which Mrs. Isabel
Acevedo León is president-and filed a petition of amparo with the Sixth Civil Court of Lima,
asserting their right to have the full-parity pension, severance and retirement system
reinstated, i.e., the system that is readjusted and renewed in accordance with Decree Law Nº
20,530. They also requested that Article 5 of Supreme Decree Nº 035-93-EF not be enforced.
Under that Article, the Peruvian State denied them their legally acquired right to receive the
same bonuses and benefits that active staff of the Comptroller General’s Office receive, in
keeping with the law on the right to the parity adjustable pension guaranteed under Decree
Law Nº 23,495.
8. The petitioners report that Lima’s Sixth Lower Court denied the petition ofamparo on July 9,
1993. But that ruling was subsequently overturned by the First Civil Law Chamber of Lima
Superior Court on December 14, 1993, which found that the provisions of Articles 9.c and 13
of Decree Law 25,597 and Article 5 of Supreme Decree Nº 036-93 EF did not apply to the
petitioners. It therefore ordered the Office of the Comptroller General to pay the Association
members the pensions, bonuses and benefits to which they were entitled.
9. When the Office of the Comptroller filed an appeal to have the Superior Court’s ruling
vacated, the Constitutional and Social Law Chamber of the Supreme Court issued a ruling on
October 3, 1994, wherein it declared the Superior Court’s December 14, 1993 ruling null and
void, and reaffirmed the lower court ruling. The petitioners then appealed that ruling by filing
an appeal with the Constitutional Tribunal, whose October 21, 1997 judgment reversed the
judgment handed down by the Constitutional and Social Law Chamber of the Supreme Court
and confirmed in part the judgment delivered by the First Civil Law Chamber of the Lima
Superior Court, which had upheld the legal grounds of the complaint and expressly ordered
that “the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic shall pay the Association members
who are the plaintiffs in this case the same salaries, bonuses and benefits paid to active
employees of that office performing functions identical, similar or equivalent to those that the
discharged or retired staff members performed.”
10. Upon notification of the Constitutional Tribunal’s judgment on December 15, 1997, the
procedure for enforcement of that judgment was instituted in the corresponding public law
court. By a ruling dated June 25, 1998, that court ordered that the judgment be enforced.
Since then, successive memoranda, injunctions and other measures have been used to get the
Comptroller’s Office to comply with the Court’s judgment, all to no avail thus far.
11. The petitioners contend that the judgement’s enforcement has been further obstructed
since February 12, 1999, when the Superior Court’s Transitional Corporatist Public Law
Chamber declared null and void all steps taken to execute the Constitutional Court’s ruling of
October 21, 1997, “while reserving the right of the Association of Discharged and Retired Staff
of the Office of the Comptroller General, to be exercised in the manner prescribed by law.”
12. The petitioners state that on May 27, 1999, they filed a remedy of amparo to challenge the
decision of the Transitional Corporatist Public Law Chamber on the grounds that their right to
effective judicial protection had been violated because the principle of res judicata and the
obligation to comply with court rulings had been breached. On January 26, 2001, the
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