10 […] [disappeared] persons have not been determined, or their remains duly found and identified, the appropriate juridical treatment for [this] situation […] is that of forced disappearance of persons.”16 35. In the instant case, the whereabouts and fate of Mr. Portugal became known when his remains were identified in August 2000. Hence, his alleged disappearance would have commenced with his detention on May 14, 1970, and would have been maintained or continued until 2000; that is, subsequent to May 9, 1990, the date on which Panama accepted the Court’s competence. Accordingly, the Court has competence to rule on the alleged forced disappearance of Heliodoro Portugal, because it continued after May 9, 1990, and up until August 2000. 36. Consequently, it is relevant and necessary to identify the facts on which the Court may rule based on the legal arguments submitted by the representatives and the Commission. First, the Court has indicated in this case that it does not have competence to rule on Mr. Portugal’s death (supra para. 32). In addition, the Court does not have competence to rule on the alleged acts of torture and ill-treatment that Mr. Portugal presumably suffered, because these acts constitute instantaneous violations that, in any event, would have occurred prior to 1990. Likewise, if Mr. Portugal’s right to freedom of expression had been restricted, this would have occurred before his death; that is, prior to the date on which Panama accepted the Court’s competence. Therefore, the Court does not have competence to rule on the violations that these facts allegedly supposed to the detriment of Mr. Portugal; in other words, violations of the rights embodied in Articles 4, 5 and 13, respectively, of the American Convention. 37. It is alleged that Mr. Portugal was detained in 1970 and that this fact, examined from the perspective of a forced disappearance, would have continued until August 2000, when the fate and whereabouts of the alleged victim were presumably discovered. In this regard, the Court finds that it has competence to rule on the alleged deprivation of liberty of Mr. Portugal, since this is related to his alleged forced disappearance, which continued after 1990, and until his remains were identified in 2000. 38. Based on the above, the Court also finds that it has competence to examine the State’s alleged failure to comply with the obligation to investigate the alleged forced disappearance of Heliodoro Portugal as of May 9, 1990, and also to examine the way in which the State conducted the respective investigations after that date. Specifically, regarding the alleged violation of the obligations contained in the Convention on Forced Disappearance, the Court has competence to rule on the respective State actions as of March 28, 1996, the date on which this Convention entered into force for the State. 39. On these grounds, the Court partially rejects the preliminary objection filed by the State on this point. 2. Competence ratione temporis regarding the alleged violation of Article 5 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of the next of kin of Heliodoro Portugal 40. The State also affirmed that the reported harm to the personal integrity of the next of kin of Heliodoro Portugal is accessory to the alleged violation of the latter’s personal integrity. Therefore, the State argued that the lack of temporal competence on the principal 16 La Cantuta v. Perú. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of November 29, 2006. Series C No. 162, para. 114.