48 and this allows impunity to be perpetuated.154 In the instant case, for example, owing to the failure to define the offense of forced disappearance in Panama, at least until the new 2007 Penal Code entered into force, the investigation was conducted under the offense of homicide, as defined in Article 131 of the 1983 Penal Code. This offense focuses only on the effect on the right to life and the criminal proceedings are subject to a statute of limitations. Consequently, in the criminal proceedings for the “homicide” of Heliodoro Portugal, a stay of proceedings was declared for those allegedly involved, owing to the statute of limitations coming into force with regard to the criminal action (supra paras. 128 and 133). The Court observes that, nonetheless, the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Panama indicated, when issuing its decision on the application of the statute of limitations to the criminal proceedings in the case of Heliodoro Portugal that, since Panama had ratified the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, and by virtue of Article VIII of that treaty, criminal proceedings concerning cases of forced disappearance are not subject to a statute of limitations.155 184. Certainly, in 1990, when the proceedings were initiated, a criminal offense of forced disappearance of persons did not exist in Panamanian law. However, the Court observes that, at that date, the obligation to define the offense of forced disappearance in keeping with the undertakings made by the State owing to its ratification of the American Convention did not exist. In light of Article 2 of the American Convention, the Court considers that, from the time the proceedings were initiated, the laws of Panama contained criminal laws conducive to respect for the human rights to life, humane treatment and personal liberty embodied in the Convention, as established in the 1983 Penal Code that was in force at the time.156 185. However, the specific obligation to define the offense of forced disappearance of persons arose for the State on March 28, 1996, when the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearances of Persons entered into force in Panama. Accordingly, it is as of this date that the Court can declare the failure to comply with that specific obligation within a reasonable time. Consequently, the Court must determine whether, in addition to the general provisions indicated in the preceding paragraph, the State defined the autonomous offense of forced disappearance specifically and adequately, as of March 28, 1996, the date on which it was internationally obliged to do so. 186. The relevant part of Article III of the said Inter-American Convention states: The States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional procedures, the legislative measures that may be needed to define the forced disappearance of persons as an offense and to impose an appropriate punishment commensurate with its extreme gravity. This offense shall be deemed continuous or permanent as long as the fate or whereabouts of the victim has not been determined […]. 187. The Court observes that, even though it assumed this obligation in 1996, the State only defined the offense of forced disappearance of persons recently in the current 2007 154 Cf. Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia. Reparations and costs. Judgment of February 27, 2002. Series C No. 92, para. 97; Case of Gómez Palomino, supra note 23, paras. 76 and 88, and Blanco Romero et al. v. Venezuela. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of November 28, 2005. Series C No. 138, para. 105. 155 Cf. Judgment of the Second Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of March 2, 2004, supra note 38, fs. 294 to 295. 156 Cf. 1982 Panamanian Penal Code, Title I “Offenses against life and personal integrity,” Articles 131 to 146, and Title II “Offenses against liberty”, Articles 147 to 171; and 2007 Penal Code, Title I “Offenses against life and personal integrity,” Articles 130 to 146, and Title II “Offenses against liberty,” Articles 147 to 166.