7 the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (hereinafter “Convention on Forced Disappearance” or “ICFDP”) and Articles 1, 6 and 8 of the InterAmerican Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (hereinafter “Convention against Torture” or “ICPPT”), and (4) the obligation to investigate and punish torture, pursuant to Articles 1, 6 and 8 of the Convention against Torture, all in relation to Article 1(1) of the American Convention. 22. The Court will proceed to examine these four arguments in the above order, together with the arguments presented by the Commission and the representatives. However, before ruling on these four specific arguments, the Court finds it pertinent to reiterate some general considerations applicable to the exercise of its competence. 23. The Court, as any organ with competenceal functions, has the authority inherent in its attributes to determine the scope of its own competence. The instruments recognizing the optional clause on compulsory competence (Article 62(1) of the Convention) presuppose the acceptance of the Court’s right to decide any dispute relating to its competence by the States that submit it.10 To determine the scope of its own competence (compétence de la compétence), the Court only has to take into account the principle of non-retroactivity of treaties established in general international law and contained in Article 28 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,11 which establishes that: Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with regard to that party. 24. Consequently, the Court cannot exercise its contentious competence to apply the Convention and declare a violation of its provisions when the alleged facts or the conduct of the defendant State that could involve international responsibility took place prior to that State’s acceptance of this competence.12 Contrario sensu, the Court is competent to rule on those violations that occurred after the date on which the State accepted the Court’s competence or that had not ceased at that date. 25. On this last point, on numerous occasions, the Court has considered that, without infringing the principle of non-retroactivity, it can exercise its competence ratione temporis to examine those facts that constitute violations of a continuing or permanent nature; in other words, those that occurred before the date on which the Court’s competence was recognized, and that persist after that date.13 26. For the Court to exercise its competence ratione temporis in relation to cases in 10 Cf. Ivcher Bronstein v. Perú. Competence. Judgment of September 24, 1999. Series C No. 54, para. 34; García Prieto et al. v. El Salvador. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of November 20 2007. Series C No. 168, para. 38, and Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile. Preliminary objections, Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 154, para. 45. 11 Cf. Cantos v. Argentina. Preliminary objections. Judgment of September 7, 2001. Series C No. 85, paras. 35 to 37; Case of García Prieto et al., supra note 10, para. 38, and Nogueira de Carvalho et al. v. Brazil. Preliminary objections and merits. Judgment of November 28, 2006. Series C No. 161, para. 43. 12 Cf. Case of Cantos, supra note 11, para. 36; Case of Nogueira de Carvalho et al., supra note 11, para. 44, and the Girls Yean and Bosicov. the Dominican Republic. Preliminary objections, Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of September 8, 2005. Series C No. 130, para. 105. 13 Cf. Case of the Serrano Cruz Sisters, supra note 9, para. 65; Case of Nogueira de Carvalho et al., supra note 11, para. 45, and Vargas Areco v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 155, para. 63.