51 implicated in its perpetration the penalties that take into account the extreme gravity of this offense.160 199. In the instant case, the Court has observed that Article 150 of the Panamanian Penal Code appears to be applicable only when there is “a refusal to provide” information about the whereabouts of someone whose deprivation of liberty is already a fact, and when it is known for certain that someone has been deprived of his liberty. This definition of the offense does not allow for a situation in which it is not known for certain whether a disappeared person is or was detained; that is to say, it does not contemplate situations in which it is not acknowledged that someone has been deprived of his liberty, even when the whereabouts of that person is unknown. It is precisely this failure to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty that, on many occasions, endangers other fundamental rights of the disappeared person. 200. Given that Article 150 of the Panamanian Penal Code does not include this element as required by the Convention, the State has failed to comply with its obligation to define the offense of forced disappearance pursuant to its international obligations in this regard. (d) Proportionality of the punishment with the gravity of the offense 201. Article III of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons places an obligation on the State to impose “an appropriate penalty commensurate with the extreme gravity” of the offense of forced disappearance. 202. Article 150 of the Panamanian Penal Code establishes a penalty of from three to five years’ imprisonment for anyone who commits the offense of forced disappearance if the disappearance lasts less than a year, and from ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment if the forced disappearance lasts more than a year. Moreover, Article 432 establishes penalties of from twenty to thirty years’ imprisonment when the offense is committed “in a generalized or systematic manner […] against the civilian population or [when, aware of a forced disappearance, it is not] prevented, having the means to do so.” 203. On other occasions, this Court has considered that it may not substitute domestic authorities in the identification of penalties corresponding to offenses established in domestic law; however, it has also indicated that the State’s response to the unlawful conduct of an agent must be commensurate with the juridical rights affected.161 On this occasion, the Court deems it appropriate to reiterate this position and recall that the States have a general obligation, in light of Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention, to ensure respect for the human rights protected by the Convention, and that the duty to prosecute unlawful conduct that violates these rights is derived from that obligation. The prosecution must be consequent with the State’s obligation to ensure rights; it is therefore necessary to avoid illusory methods that only appear to satisfy the formal legal requirements. In this regard, the rule of proportionality requires that the States, in exercising their duty to prosecute, impose penalties that truly contribute to prevent impunity, taking into account various factors such as the characteristics of the offense, and the participation and guilt of the 160 161 Cf. Case of Gómez Palomino, supra note 23, para. 103. Cf. Case of Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C No. 133, paras. 70 and 133; Case of Vargas Areco, supra note 13, para. 108, and Case of the Rochela Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of May 11, 2007. Series C No. 163, para. 196.