3 Román and Patria Kriss, as well as the obligation to define the offense of torture, derived from Articles 1, 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture and of Articles 2 (Domestic Legal Effects), 4 (Right to Life), 7 (Right to Personal Liberty), 8 (Right to a Fair Trial) and 25 (Judicial Protection) of the American Convention, all in relation to Article 1(1) thereof. They also requested the adoption of various measures of reparation and the reimbursement of the costs and expenses incurred when processing the case at both the domestic and the international levels. 5. On June 26, 2007, the State submitted its brief with preliminary objections, the answer to the application and observations on the pleas and motions brief (hereinafter, “answer to the application”). The State presented three preliminary objections, questioning the admissibility of the application owing to the alleged failure to exhaust domestic remedies, and alleged that the Court did not have competence either ratione temporis or ratione materiae in relation to this case. In particular, the State argued that the next of kin had not filed any specific complaint (querella) or private action in order to intervene directly in the criminal proceeding, so that the domestic remedies had not been exhausted; that there had not been an unjustified delay in the domestic judicial proceedings on the reported facts; that the Court did not have competence over the alleged violation of Articles 4, 5, 7, and 13 of the Convention because the death, alleged mistreatment, detention and alleged violation of the freedom of expression of Heliodoro Portugal occurred before or during June 1971, 19 years before the State accepted the compulsory competence of the Court, and seven years before Panama ratified the Convention; that the lack of competence over the principal fact extended to the secondary facts, such as the presumed adverse effects on the personal integrity and freedom of expression of Mr. Portugal’s next of kin; that the obligation to define the offenses of forced disappearance of persons and torture arose after the date on which the facts of the instant case allegedly occurred, and this obligation cannot be interpreted retroactively, and that the State’s obligation to define the offense of forced disappearance of persons cannot be ordered in the context of a contentious case. Lastly, the State alleged the inadmissibility of the claim for compensation for the alleged loss of rights of ownership over a piece of land belonging to Heliodoro Portugal’s next of kin, because the corresponding domestic remedies had not been exhausted. II PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT 6. The Commission’s application was notified to the State2 and to the representatives in a communication of February 27, 2007. During the proceedings before this Court, the Commission and the representatives presented their principal briefs on merits (supra paras. 3 and 4), and on August 5 and 8, 2007, respectively, they presented their arguments on the preliminary objections presented by the State. 2 When notifying the application to the State, the Court advised the State of the possibility of appointing a Judge ad hoc for the instant case. On March 22, 2007, the State appointed Juan Antonio Tejada Espino as Judge ad hoc. On April 11, 2007, the representatives asked the Court “to declare that Mr. Tejada Espino is not qualified to take part in the processing of the case in [that] capacity.” In its observations, the Commission indicated that it “noted that it appeared that the person proposed had taken part in the investigative measures related to the case […].” The State alleged that “Mr. […] Tejada Espino has clarified that, while he was the First Superior Prosecutor of the First Judicial District, he was not responsible for investigating the Heliodoro Portugal case[…].” The representatives, in their observations on the State’s communication, reiterated the Commission’s allegations in its brief with observations. On May 10, 2007, the Court issued an Order in which it decided “[t]o reject the recusal submitted by the representatives […] against Juan Antonio Tejada Espino.” Subsequently, on May 9, 2008, Juan Antonio Tejada Espino asked the President of the Court to excuse him from hearing the instant case. The same day, the President of the Court accepted his recusal.