50 in Article 150 of the current Panamanian Penal Code is that the offense of deprivation of personal liberty is perpetrated by a public servant “in abuse of his functions or in violation of legal procedures” or by a private individual acting “with the authorization or support of the public servants” (supra para. 190). By limiting the deprivation of liberty in this context to those situations in which this is unlawful, thus excluding legitimate forms of deprivation of liberty, the definition of the offense deviates from the minimum requirements of the Convention. It should be emphasized that the Inter-American Convention refers, as a basic element, to deprivation of liberty “in whatever way.” In other words, it is irrelevant how the deprivation came about: whether it was lawful or unlawful, violent or peaceful, for example. 193. In this regard, the definition of this offense in the Panamanian Penal Code is similar to the definition that the Court found insufficient in Blanco Romero et al.159 In that case, as in this one, the description of the conduct constituting a forced disappearance referred only to the unlawful deprivation of liberty, which excludes other forms of deprivation of liberty. For example, deprivation of liberty can be lawful at the start, but can become unlawful after a certain period of time or under certain circumstances. 194. Likewise, if it is considered that the text of Article 150 of the Penal Code contemplates the possibility that “private individuals who act with the authorization or support of public servants” can commit the offense of forced disappearance, it is not clear under what circumstances a private individual can deprive someone of his liberty “in abuse of his functions or in violation of legal procedures”. 195. This ambiguity in part of the definition of the offense of forced disappearance contained in the said Article 150 of the Panamanian Penal Code results in a definition that is less comprehensive than the one required by Articles II and III of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons; this implies that the State has not complied with this obligation under that Convention. b) Disjunction between the elements of deprivation of liberty and refusal to provide information on the whereabouts of the disappeared 196. The Panamanian definition of the offense of forced disappearance establishes that this offense occurs in one of the following two cases, but not in both: (1) when someone is deprived of their personal liberty unlawfully, or (2) when there is a refusal to provide information on the whereabouts of persons detained unlawfully (supra para. 190). This disjunction creates confusion, since the first hypothesis can correspond to the general prohibition on unlawful deprivation of liberty. Moreover, the international norms require the presence of both elements: both the deprivation of liberty, in whatever way, and also the refusal to provide information in that regard. 197. Therefore, the aforementioned disjunction results in a failure on the part of the State to fulfill its international obligations pursuant to Articles II and III of the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons. (c) Refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty 198. An essential element of forced disappearance is the refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty. This element must be present in the definition of the offense because this allows it to be distinguished from the other offenses to which it is usually related, such as abduction, in order to apply the appropriate probative criteria and impose on those 159 Cf. Case of Blanco Romero et al., supra note 154, para. 105.