9 the partial acknowledgement of the facts” and indicated that it “regarded this decision by the State as a measure that contributes to resolving the case.” However, it considered that: The State’s acknowledgement of international responsibility arises from an interpretation of the facts that differs from the one described in the Commission’s application brief and in the brief with pleadings, motions, and evidence. In this regard, […] neither the juridical implications of those facts nor the pertinence of the reparations requested by the parties have been totally accepted by the State. Specifically, the Commission indicated that: According to the State, its omission to comply with the obligation to guarantee rights by failing to protect an individual who was known to be in danger is the only source of its responsibility; however, [according to the Commission], in addition to this, the State’s responsibility arises from the acts and omissions of its officials in the investigations into the facts and from the acts of members of the paramilitary group, inasmuch as the State itself contributed to the legal and factual structure on which its existence was based. Consequently, the Commission asked the Court that: It accept as proven those facts that have been accepted unconditionally and without reservations as totally true by the State; in keeping with its powers, make its own determination of the facts that remain in dispute; and rule on the matters that remain in dispute relating to the assessment and juridical consequences of both the facts acknowledged by the State and those proved by the evidence. 27. In its brief with observations on the partial acknowledgement of responsibility made by the State, as well as during the said public hearing, the representatives asked the Court “not to accept the acknowledgement of responsibility based on omission proposed by the State.” They considered that: The State’s acknowledgement of responsibility in this particular case has no real content and constitutes only a legal formula that not only attempts to hide the gravity of the State crime committed against Jesús María Valle, but is also used [by the State] as a mechanism to present itself as respectful of the international human rights obligations and commitments it has assumed. […] [The representatives added] that the State’s intention that the Court declare its responsibility exclusively with regard to omission of the obligation to guarantee rights gravely affects the exercise of the rights to the truth, justice, and adequate and integral reparation for the victims. […] Colombia […] should guarantee that its acknowledgement of responsibility will allow the impunity of the State agents involved in the human rights violations to be overcome, rather than serve to cloak impunity. [The representatives’] rejection of the meaning and scope of the State’s acknowledgement of responsibility does not arise merely from the fact that it is a partial acknowledgement, but from the fact that an acknowledgement of responsibility by omission excludes the participation of State agents as co-authors, accomplices, or instigators in the alleged violations and has the effect of restricting the expectations of truth and justice of the victims and their next of kin[. A]lso, it has a direct impact on the determination of the measures of reparation designed to prevent a repetition of facts of this nature […]. 28. According to Articles 53(2) and 55 of the Rules of Procedure, in the exercise of its inherent powers of international judicial protection of human rights, the Court can determine whether an acknowledgement of international responsibility made by a defendant State offers sufficient grounds, according to the American Convention, to continue hearing the merits and deciding the possible reparations and costs. To this end, the Court examines the circumstances of each specific case.5 Consequently, it will proceed to define the meaning and scope of the partial acknowledgement of responsibility made by the State and the extent of the subsisting dispute. 5 Cf. Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 25, 2003. Series C No. 101, para. 105; Albán Cornejo et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 22, 2007. Series C No. 171, para. 14; and Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 21, 2007. Series C No. 170, para. 27.