defense on the basis of a cassation appeal. In that respect, the Commission concludes that the State of Argentina violated, to his detriment, his right to appeal the judgment as set forth in Article 8.2 h) of the Convention, in connection with the obligations established in Articles 1.1 and 2 thereof. The Commission also concludes that, as a result of the limited nature of the cassation appeal and the even more limited nature of the extraordinary appeal, the victim did not have simple and effective judicial remedies in the framework of the criminal proceedings that led to his conviction, in violation also of the right set forth in Article 25.1 of the Convention, in connection with the obligations of articles 1.1 and 2 thereof. 3. Consideration regarding subsequent developments on the right to appeal a judgment 64. The Commission has concluded that the State of Argentina violated the right to appeal the judgment, as enshrined in Article 8.2 h) of the American Convention, to the detriment of Mr. Gorigoitia. 65. These violations did not occur because of an isolated interpretation by a judge in the specific case of the victim, but rather occurred in the context of a legislation and practice that excluded a review of the facts and the appraisal and reception of evidence. Because of this, the Commission concluded that the State failed to fulfill not only the right enshrined in Article 8.2 h) of the American Convention but also the obligation to adopt domestic law provisions as indicated in Article 2 thereof. 66. Bearing in mind the more general scope of these conclusions, the Commission cannot refrain from referring to the developments that have appeared subsequent to the decisions analyzed in the preceding paragraphs. In particular, the Commission highlights the judgment issued by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation on September 20, 2006, known as the “Casal judgment.” 67. As indicated in the section on established facts, on the basis of this decision, the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation reviewed the judicial practice of the courts in Argentina, especially the Court of Criminal Cassation Appeals, regarding the restrictive interpretation of the norms governing the cassation appeal and the resulting denial of said appeal when a request was made to review the issues involving facts or appraisal of evidence. Taking into account the relevant provisions of international human rights law and expressly mentioning Article 8.2 h) of the American Convention and Article 14.5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation indicated the need to change this restrictive interpretation for a broader one that would not confine the review to issues of law, but rather would include those issues of fact or appraisal of evidence, with the limitation to what is exclusively reserved to those who have been present as judges in the oral proceedings.54 54 Some relevant excerpts of the decision: [I]t must be interpreted that Article 8.2 h) of the Convention and Article 14.5 of the Covenant [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] require the review of all that is not exclusively reserved to those who have been present as judges in the oral proceedings. This is the only thing that cassation appeal judges cannot assess, not only because it would nullify the principle of transparency, but also because they do not directly examine it; in other words, regarding them there is a real limitation in terms of knowledge. It directly involves a factual limitation, imposed by the nature of things, and which must be assessed in each case. (…) Although it is certain that this can only be established in each case, what is certain is that, in general, there is not much present in the characteristic of the knowledge coming exclusively from the intermediation. As a rule, a large part of the evidence can be found in the case itself recorded in writing, whether as a document or expertise. The principal question is generally confined to witnesses. (…) [I]n short, it must be understood that Article 456 of the Criminal Procedures Code of the Nation must be construed to mean that it authorizes a broad review of the judgment, as extensively as possible on the basis of the maximum effort for review by the cassation appeal judges, in line with the possibilities and records of each particular case without magnifying the questions reserved for intermediation, inevitable only because of the prevalence of orality, in conformity with the nature of things. This understanding is imposed as a result of […] (b) the practical impossibility of differentiating between issues of fact and law, which inevitably tends to establish a sphere of selective arbitrariness (…). 14