68. The Commission positively assesses the Casal judgment and views it as a preliminary effort to ensure the compatibility between judicial practices and Argentina’s international human rights obligations. The clarification provided by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation is especially relevant, in the sense that the distinction between issues of fact and law must not be the determining element for the admissibility of a cassation appeal. The only limitation envisaged in the Casal judgment is the limitation associated with the evidence that was directly heard by the judge present at the oral proceedings, mainly testimonial evidence. 69. Nevertheless, according to available information, on the basis of IACHR’s case system and monitoring work, this judgment has not led to sufficient changes in order to address the problems highlighted in the present analysis. One of the obstacles encountered by the Commission to conclude that the State has remedied this problem is the absence of enforceability of the Casal judgment. The Commission observes that the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation abstained from declaring that Article 456 of the CPPN—governing the admissibility of cassation appeals and which, as indicated, is almost identical in terms of contents to Article 474 of the CPPM—said judgment constitutes a milestone in terms of interpretation but judges are not legally bound to enforce it.55 Even further, the Commission notes that the milestone in terms of interpretation provided by the Casal judgment is not evident in the standard’s wording. 70. It should be mentioned that, in 2010, the Human Rights Committee of the CCPR referred to the persistence of problems that prevent a substantive review of the judgments of conviction in Argentina. According to the above-mentioned Committee: The Committee notes with concern the absence of procedural law and practice that would guarantee the effective implementation of the right set out in article 14, paragraph 5, of the Covenant throughout the country (article 14 of the Covenant). The State party should take the necessary and effective measures to guarantee the right of every person who is convicted of a crime to have the conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. In this connection, the Committee recalls its general comment No. 32 on the right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, which emphasizes, in paragraph 48, the need to review substantively the conviction and sentence.56 71. Afterwards, in 2013, the Inter-American Court issued its judgment in the case of Mendoza et al., adopting the same stance as the IACHR regarding the Casal judgment. With respect to this, it pointed out that it “assesses positively the Casal judgment […] with regard to the criteria it reveals with regard to the scope of the right to appeal the judgment before a higher judge or court.” The Court considered “that judges in Argentina must continue exercising control of conformity with the Convention in order to ensure the right to appeal a judgment pursuant to Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention.” Without detriment to the above, it instructed, as a reparation measure, the State to adapt its domestic laws to the parameters of the present court’s case law on the right to appeal the judgment before a judge or higher court. 72. Although the Inter-American Court called upon judicial authorities to monitor the enforcement of conventions regarding this, and in any case considered it was necessary to order, in the light of Article 2 of the Convention, an adaptation of the legal regulatory framework in line with the parameters of the judgment. 55 In the “Casal” judgment, it is indicated that Article 456 of the CPPN permits a restrictive interpretation but also admits a broad interpretation. In the words of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation: “(…) it is clear that, in the text of subparagraph 2 of Article 456 of the CPPN, there is nothing preventing another interpretation. The only thing that determines a restrictive interpretation of the scope of the cassation appeal is the legislative and historical tradition of this institution in its original version. The wording itself allows both a restrictive and a broad interpretation: the semantic resistance of the text is not altered nor does it go beyond the latter (…).” 56 Human Rights Committee. Concluding observations on Argentina. CCPR/C/ARG/CO/4. 31 March 2010. Para. 19. 15