indifferent attitude to rules of procedure that can determine a gross negligence, on the contrary on the basis of this same reasoning, it is inferred that he acted contrary to the duties of his job, breaching regulations, with a large dose of recklessness. In other words, that there was an absence of caution but no prediction that the death of Hugo Gómez would be caused.13 32. On December 19, 1997, the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Mendoza decided to dismiss the cassation appeal “because it was formally inadmissible.”14 33. The Second Chamber pointed out that the cassation appeal “must be motivated and this motivation must be provided by the complainant in the same document filing the proceeding, concretely determining the grievance, both in terms of the defect it is denouncing and in terms of the law that substantiates it.”15 In that regard, it indicated the following: (…) when the absence of motive in the judgment is claimed, it is necessary to individualize the defective proceeding, (…) pointing out the reasonable possibility of impact from the illegal or omitted evidence in the reasoning of the court examining the merits (…). With respect to the alleged substantive motive, it should be dismissed in limine because the appeal’s arguments reveal, in short, the discrepancy of the appraisal made by the plaintiff with the Chamber’s criterion regarding evidence legally incorporated into the discussion, because the Cassation Court cannot review or judge the motives that constituted the conviction issued by the lower Court (…).16 34. The Second Chamber added that “the Chamber has clearly, completely, and abundantly substantiated the gross negligence that it attributes to the conduct of the accused,” for which purpose it quoted textually the reasoning of the Chamber.17 Likewise, the Second Chamber indicated that the Chamber had closely examined the hypothesis that the accused had acted culpably.18 As a result, it ruled that the appeal that was filed should be dismissed.19 13 Criminal cassation appeal, filed before the First Criminal Court of Mendoza, September 29, 1997, page 22, Attachment to the petition of January 19, 1999. Attachment to the initial petition. 14 Judicial Branch of Mendoza, Case File No. 63.145: “F. c/ GORIGOITIA GUERRERO. Oscar,” Supreme Court of Justice of Mendoza, December 19, 1997, page 2. Attachment to the initial petition. 15 Judicial Branch of Mendoza, Case File No. 63.145: “F. c/ GORIGOITIA GUERRERO. Oscar,” Supreme Court of Justice of Mendoza, December 19, 1997, page 2. Attachment to the initial petition. 16 Judicial Branch of Mendoza, Case File No. 63.145: “F. c/ GORIGOITIA GUERRERO. Oscar,” Supreme Court of Justice of Mendoza, December 19, 1997, page 3. Attachment to the initial petition. 17 Specifically, it indicated that, according to the Court, “it cannot be doubted that, in the scenario in which the final outcome of this story unfolded (sticking exclusively, as did the civilian stakeholders and the Attorney General’s Office, to what occurred starting at the Olive Bridge up to the arrest on highway R-6 in San Martín 6264 de Carrodilla for more than 5 kilometers), the death that occurred could not have been foreseen or that Gorigoitia acted in the hopes that this would be the outcome, trusting his skills. On the contrary, all evidence indicates that he imagined the possible outcome (death) and, driven by his selfishness ignored the order not to use firearms, fired repeatedly with the two arms provided (Itaka, 9 mm).” 18 Specifically, the court indicated that it dismissed the malicious intent when it contends that “in this framework of action, pretending that all Gorigoitia did was to fail to observe the regulations, along with the recklessness that would tend to establish his conduct as culpable which would be supported in the crime of culpable homicide (Article 84 of the Criminal Code), I believe involves ignoring the evidence against the accused, which shows a reality that is different from what happened, which was much more severe. The indifference to the outcome of a severe action such as aiming at a moving motor vehicle from another one chasing it, with a high-caliber and long-range gun, aware of its bullets’ power to damage, excludes all form of culpability, even when there is representation and it adequately fulfills the classification requirement of negligence, viewed as gross, because to invoke mere guilt with awareness would require that the agent’s action not be directly aimed at one or more given persons.” 19 Judicial Branch of Mendoza, Case File No. 63.145: “F. c/ GORIGOITIA GUERRERO. Oscar”, Supreme Court of Justice of Mendoza, December 19, 1997, page 4. Attachment to the initial petition. 7