imposed against Mr. Lagos del Campo. According to the petitioners, the judge limited him or herself to confirming the existence of an alleged offense against the honor of the company, without examining the alleged violation of the alleged victim’s right to freedom of expression or justifying the necessity and proportionality of the dismissal as a measure restricting this right. 25. Second, the petitioners alleged the violation of Mr. Lagos del Campo’s “right to be heard by a judge or a court” in relation to the adversarial principle. The petitioners alleged the violation of this trial right because “in handling the classification of dismissal case, the Second Labor Court failed to appropriately process the pleading dated August 2, 1991, contesting the arguments of the respondent, which was not processed by that court until August 9, 1989, the day after the judgment was issued.” Third, the petitioners claimed the violation of the alleged victim’s “right to challenge court decisions.” On this point, they explained that Mr. Lagos del Campo did not have an opportunity to challenge the dismissal of his petition for a constitutional remedy [amparo] by the Fifth Civil Chamber, given that the Constitutional Court was shut down by Alberto Fujimori’s “self-coup” in 1992 and the subsequent removal of the Court’s justices. 26. Finally, the petitioners argued that the penalty of dismissal adversely affected Mr. Lagos del Campo because he was the sole breadwinner in his family, and had 6 children in school when he was fired. They additionally stated that he has incurred expenses for his defense in both the domestic and international cases, and that he has been stigmatized. Furthermore, they noted that his dismissal has affected his prospects for obtaining a retirement pension and health insurance, and to assist his wife, who is in poor health. B. Position of the State 27. According to the State, the main issue raised in this case was resolved in the judgment of the court of second instance, which found that “The offending statements that [the worker] made to the media [demonstrated his] responsibility […] for the charges attributed to him by the company.” In reaching this conclusion, the court of second instance based its analysis on the concept of “serious infraction” provided for in Article 5(b) of Law 24514, which lists as a ground for dismissal, “committing violence, serious insubordination, or serious verbal misconduct against the employer, its representatives, senior staff, or coworkers, either in the workplace, or off the workplace premises when the acts stem directly from the employment relationship.” The State asserted that the fact that the court failed to rule in the alleged victim’s favor, and that his appeals or prayers for relief were ruled inadmissible, does not mean that his rights were violated. 28. The State maintained that in this case “there was no limitation to the freedom of expression of Alfredo Lagos del Campo that resulted in his dismissal. This matter concerns the commission of serious infractions defined in the laws in force at the time.” According to the State, the alleged victim “was fired for good cause, in compliance with the provisions of Law 24514.” Under that law, the employment relationship can only be terminated for good cause, including the worker’s conduct and ability. It asserted that, in this case, “the law was applied; that is, employee Alfredo Lagos del Campo’s conduct amounted to a serious infraction, which resulted in his dismissal.” 29. On this point, the State asserted that although the law was repealed on March 27, 1997—by legislative decree 728—it was never challenged before the Constitutional Court of that time, and therefore is presumed to be lawful and constitutional. 30. The State additionally maintained that freedom of expression does not include the right to insult an employer or coworkers. It stated that in this case, Alfredo Lagos del Campo “offended not only his employers at the CEPER-PIRELLI company but also his coworkers.” According to the State, the alleged victim reportedly accused the company’s directors of “blackmailing and coercing the employee-owners,” and said that those employee-owners “live under the threat of blackmail by management.” In that respect, the State recalled that the Second Labor Court concluded that “The Constitution of Peru guarantees freedom of expression, but not to insult the personal honor and dignity of the employer company’s senior staff, as has occurred in the instant case.” The State reiterated that, “This matter does not concern a limitation to the right of expression; it concerns the commission of a serious infraction that goes beyond expression.” 5