applies to the prosecution of a particular individual; such a provision is recognized by international public law and accepted in the supranational legal system prescribed in Article 145 of our Constitution. (…) The ban on opposing preliminary issues and on recusals, prior matters, and appeals of any type, established by Article 2 of the aforementioned administrative resolution of the Senate, blatantly violates the defense’s guarantee to a hearing by impartial judges (Article 16 of the Constitution), as well as the right to petition established in Article 40, also of our Constitution. (…) In the same administrative decision here being contested, the provision in Article 4 expresses, at the end, that “each party’s defense may not last for more than three hours.” And we well know that any limitation to the right to a defense goes against the cardinal principle of the inviolability of the defense, contained in Article 16 of the Constitution; furthermore, we can cite the Supreme Law itself, which in Article 17(7) imposes the obligation to ensure that a person is provided “prior and detailed notification of the charges, and has available the necessary copies, means, and time required to prepare a defense while in free communication.” In these circumstances, it is patently and unequivocally clear that the regulatory act of a procedural nature established in RESOLUTION No. 122, of 11/25/03, handed down by the Honorable Senate, is blatantly unconstitutional (…).15 39. With respect to Resolution 134, the Constitutional Chamber indicated that: (…) In all the expositions, no concrete acts are attributed to those removed from office; it is only stated that there were 44 votes for the removal of Carlos Fernández Gadea and 43 votes for the removal of Dr. Bonifacio Ríos Ávalos. Those passing judgment have established no facts; the ruling is not reasoned either from a factual or legal standpoint. The judgment, in this case, is based on the autocratic will of “voters” (rather than judges), as they did not explain why they have proceeded in this manner, which inevitably makes any decision or sanction arbitrary: And so, we are in the presence of an arbitrary judgment, and any arbitrary judgment is unconstitutional. (…) The 2003 removal was not for legal reasons but for reasons that were strictly political. It is true that an impeachment proceeding (juicio político) may respond to “political motives,” and generally does; however, what cannot or what should not be accepted is that “legal motives” are invoked for the proceedings and that the trial ends by condemning or punishing someone for “political reasons,” and that to achieve this “political objective,” procedures that are unexpected or non-existent in a previously enacted law are used, and that these procedures openly defy not only the “principle of legality” that should govern the conduct of the entire Government, but even the prevailing Rule of Law, infringing on higher laws that make up the Constitutional Rights and Guarantees, whose protection and effectiveness have been placed under the supervision of this Constitutional Chamber (…) (…) Clearly, in the case sub judice, putting Justices of the Supreme Court on trial for the opinions they expressed in the judgments specified above has involved not only a grave error committed against the judicial immunity recognized in the Constitution itself for all judges, but also, because the ruling being contested could even amount to an “attack on the independence of the judiciary,” a “punishable offense” characterized as such by the Constitution itself, which lays out the following punishment: “Those who attack the independence of the Judiciary and of its judges shall be disqualified from exercising any public function for five consecutive years, in addition to being subject to any penalties set by law” (Article 248).16 15 16 Annex 10. Judgments 951 and 952. Annex to the January 16, 2010, written observations of Carlos Fernández. Annex 10. Judgments 951 and 952. Annex to the January 16, 2010, written observations of Carlos Fernández. 10