8. On January 14, 2008 the Commission reiterated a request for information to the State,
requesting a response in one month, regarding its observations on the pertinent parts of the
petition and information in connection with the precautionary measures in Mr. Cadogan’s favor.
9. On January 18, 2008 the Commission requested additional information from the petitioner.
10. On February 22, 2008, the Commission received additional information from the petitioner
and transmitted this information to the State for its observations.
11. To date, there has been no response from the State regarding the request for observations
on the pertinent petition.
III.
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
A.
Petitioner
12. The Petitioner alleges that, on May 18, 2005, Mr. Cadogan was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death by hanging by the Supreme Court of Barbados, pursuant to section 2 of the
State’s Offences Against the Person Act of 1994, which stipulates the mandatory application of
the death penalty for the crime of murder. 1 Subsequently, on May 31, 2006, Mr. Cadogan
presented an appeal to the Court of Appeal of Barbados and was unsuccessful. Finally he filed
an application for special leave to appeal as a poor person with the Caribbean Court of Justice,
but this motion was dismissed by the Court on December 4, 2006.
13. The Petitioner claims that his right to fair trial was violated for the following reasons: (1)
the diminished responsibility defense was not adequately raised by the appointed judge before
the jury in his trial; (2) he was not provided with independent psychiatric expertise; (3) the
legal assistance provided to him by the State was insufficient; and (4) his attorney was
ineffective.
14. Regarding the first claim, the Petitioner alleges that the trial judge should have placed the
defense of diminished responsibility before the jury for its consideration and that he should
have given the jury a careful and accurate direction on substantial impairment of mental
responsibility due to Mr. Cadogan’s alleged undisputed history of alcohol and drug abuse.
Petitioners cite the “Offences Against the Person Act”, 2 which exempts the accused from being
convicted of murder in a situation of diminished responsibility. While the State has the burden
of proof to establish the requisite intent for murder, 3 petitioner states that the burden of proof
for diminished responsibility rests with the defense. Petitioner cites relevant sections of the
“Offences Against the Person Act”:
Where a person kills or is a party to a killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder if he
was suffering from such abnormality of mind, whether arising from a condition of arrested or
retarded development of mind, or any inherent causes, or induced by disease or injury, as
substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or being party
to the killing. On a charge of murder it shall be for the defense to prove that the person charged
4
is by virtue of this section not liable to be convicted of murder.
[I]if he was suffering from an abnormality of mind, whether arising from a condition of arrested
or retarded development of mind, or any inherent causes, or induced by disease or injury, as
substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts or omissions in doing or being party to
1
The petitioner cites the Offences Against the Person Act, September 1st 1994, Ch.141, Section 2: “any person
convicted of murder shall be sentenced to, and suffer, death”. Another exception is applicable to persons under the
age of 18 and to pregnant women. Cf. Boyce Case, notes number 38 and 39 referring to Section 14 of the Juvenile
Offenders Act and Section 2 of the Sentence of Death (Expectant Mothers) Act
2
The petitioner cites the Offences against the Person Act, Section 4 (2).
3
4
The petitioner cites the Offences against the Person Act, Section 3(1).
The petitioner cites the Offences against the Person Act Section 4.
2