21 Slander and injuria should be decriminalized for “all types of citizens,” with no distinction made between “ordinary citizens” and public officials. Offenses against honor “are used in exactly the same way” as the offense of disrespect or contempt for authority (desacato). The difference consists in whether the act takes place in the public or private sphere. In the practice, offenses against honor do not protect honor, because, when a trial is conducted, the slander and injuria become “public knowledge,” since they are publicly repeated before each instance of the proceeding. These offenses protect “all public officials,” their business partners, and their entrepreneurial friends. Essentially, the inhibiting effect of prosecuting an individual for the offenses of slander and injuria occurs with the initiation of the proceeding. It is quite common for political leaders not to continue with actions because they know that the inhibitory effect has been achieved; what interests them is the “intimidating effect of the complaint.” There are different points of view concerning the decriminalization of the offenses of injuria, slander and libel. Those who are against decriminalization of these offenses are generally individuals exercising public functions or some scholars who consider the rule of intent to be sufficient, and that including the actual malice principle is a foreign “implant.” There are situations when, in the face of political or financial power, the journalist is the weak factor in the equation; and there are other situations when, to the contrary, the media is the strong factor in the equation, in the case of the ordinary individual. The ordinary individual’s right to honor can be strengthened by the right of reply. In the case of reparations for possible restrictions to the freedom of the press and freedom of expression, in addition to the right of reply, there is also civil reparation. Furthermore, in most of “our countries”, public officials appoint the judges and “hold the key to [their] removal.” Consequently, equality before the law between an ordinary individual and a public official who files a complaint against this individual is not perfect, as it should be; they are not equal before the courts. The American Convention does not establish that States have an obligation to decriminalize offenses against honor. The Convention establishes the right of reply. Nevertheless, to the extent that criminalization is not necessary to preserve democratic public order, “it should yield”; in other words, it does not respond to a social imperative, and there are other less overpowering recourses to protect the rights and guarantees included in the Convention. This criminalization exists “in almost all the countries in the region.” He is aware of the penal reforms carried out in Paraguay, which are an important step forward. The penal legislation in force in Paraguay that categorizes slander “could be sufficient to resolve this case, but it is not sufficient to resolve the general problem we have described, which occurs in Paraguay and in the rest of the countries in the region.” It is insufficient because it does not differentiate between the ordinary individual and the public official, which is the minimum that could be added to the norm.