62 the court were the guarantee in the case of other sureties. In this respect, and according “to information provided by the petitioners, which has not been challenged by the State, Ricardo Canese provided effective sureties to the judicial authorities.” Hence, the prohibition to leave the country imposed on Ricardo Canese lacked a legal basis, since Paraguayan legislation in force when the sentence was handed down did not establish the prohibition to leave the country as an integral part of the punishment; therefore, it was contrary to the Convention; e) The new Code of Criminal Procedures establishes the possibility of prohibiting departure from the country as a provisional precautionary measure. However, it also provides for other measures that are less restrictive of freedom of movement, which should have been applied to Ricardo Canese, given his personal situation; f) The time during which Mr. Canese’s permission to leave the country was restricted is completely disproportionate to the interest the measure was intended to protect, which was his presence at the proceedings; particularly bearing in mind that there were other guarantees, such as the material surety provided by Ricardo Canese. It should also be considered that the measure was disproportionate and continued beyond a reasonable time, because it was applied during more than eight years, when the possible sanction applicable was a few months; g) The State has not demonstrated the need for the measure imposed on Mr. Canese. Despite the existence of the restriction to his freedom of movement, Mr. Canese left the country on several occasions, as a result of filing a petition for habeas corpus, and he returned to Paraguay without trying to evade the legal proceedings; h) The restrictions became “a reprisal or an alternative, anticipated sanction not established by law[,] instead of a precautionary measure to protect the proceedings.” Any measure that restricts freedom, if it is purely procedural, must be exceptional and, when ordering it, the personal situation of the defendant and the guarantees that exist to ensure the security of the proceedings must be taken into account; and i) The State did not prove the essential nature, proportionality, and necessity of the arbitrary measures that restricted the freedom of movement of the alleged victim. These measures became an anticipated sanction that is not established in the Paraguay Penal Code. Arguments of the representatives of the alleged victim 111. Regarding Article 22 of the Convention, the representatives stated that they endorsed the arguments set out by the Commission, and emphasized that: a) Mr. Canese was subjected to a permanent restriction to leave the country and the judicial authorities only lifted this restriction in exceptional circumstances and irregularly; b) “The prohibition to leave the country was not established in Paraguayan law.” According to the legislation in force at the time of the facts,